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THE CASE FOR SYMMETRY IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
 
Naomi Schoenbaum* 
 
Forthcoming Wisconsin Law Review (2017) 
 
Antidiscrimination law faces a fundamental design question: the choice 
between symmetry and asymmetry.  A symmetrical law prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of a trait for a universal class of persons, and 
for both “sides” of the trait.  An asymmetrical law prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of one “side” of the trait, and for a limited class of persons.  
Current law is inconsistent in its design.  For example, employment 
discrimination law prohibits race discrimination symmetrically (everyone is 
protected, and on the basis of any race), but prohibits disability 
discrimination asymmetrically (only the disabled are protected, and only on 
the basis of disability).  This critical design choice has received scant 
attention outside of the affirmative action context, leaving this key 
inconsistency in current law unexplained, and the implications unexplored.   
Relying on employment discrimination law and the traits of race, sex, 
disability, and age as core examples, this Article provides the first 
systematic study of this design choice.  It makes the case for symmetry on 
three grounds: purpose, practice, and politics.  As for the purpose of 
antidiscrimination law, this Article reaches the counterintuitive conclusion 
that a symmetrical design that protects everyone is effective not only at 
reducing classifications on the basis of protected traits, but also at 
improving the labor market circumstances of subordinated groups.  When it 
comes to practice, a symmetrical law avoids challenges arising from 
protected-class determinations that limit plaintiffs’ ability to pursue their 
claims.  Finally, symmetrical antidiscrimination laws are more likely to 
produce positive policy feedback, generating greater support for these laws.  
After discussing how to optimize symmetry, this Article explores further 
applications, including additional traits, such as appearance and sexual 
orientation, and additional areas of law, such as housing law, education 
law, and constitutional law.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Last year Senator Tom Harkin, a key proponent of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA),1 shared the experience of his deaf brother 
becoming employed at a factory.2  After having the chance to show his 
worth as a worker, Harkin’s brother performed quite well.  In fact, as 
Harkin explained, the employer was so impressed with the special ability 
that his brother’s condition conferred—avoiding the noise and distraction of 
the factory—that he might prefer deaf workers to hearing workers in the 
future.3  Although the ADA bars employers from discriminating against the 
disabled, an employer who favors the disabled to the non-disabled faces no 
legal barrier in doing so.4   
Consider a similar case in the context of sex.  An employer prefers 
women rather than men to fill the job of flight attendant because it believes 
that women are “superior in such non-mechanical aspects of the job as 
providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized 
service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as possible . . . .”5  
Here, however, such preferences are unlawful, as the prohibition on sex 
discrimination bans not only discrimination against women in favor of men, 
but also discrimination against men in favor of women.6 
These examples highlight a critical design choice for every 
antidiscrimination law, what this Article terms the choice between 
symmetry and asymmetry.  Under a symmetrical law like Title VII of the 
                                                
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-113.  
2 See Tom Harkin, Senator, U.S. Senate, Address at the Employment Discrimination 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act at Twenty-Five Years Panel of the American 
Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 3, 2015).   
3 See id.; Linda Federico-O'Murchu, How Employers Are Tapping Talents of Disabled 
Workers, CNBC (July 24, 2014, 8:24 a.m.), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101867230 
(documenting how employers prefer autistic employees for some positions because “[t]raits 
like extreme mathematical, scientific and mechanical aptitude are so coveted by certain 
industries that accompanying conditions, such as social anxiety, have become an accepted 
part of the equation”). 
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (“Nothing in [the ADA] shall provide the basis for a claim 
by an individual without a disability that the individual was subject to discrimination 
because of the individual’s lack of disability.”); Ortner v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., No. 
91 CA 3146, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 612, 612 (1992) (D.C. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 10, 1992) (dismissing discrimination suit brought by able-bodied employee denied 
promotion by Paralyzed Veterans of America because he was not disabled). 
5 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971).   
6 See, e,g., Scott v. Parkview Mem’l Hosp., 175 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 1999); Longariello 
v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe Cnty., 161 F.3d 21 (11th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. El Paso Cnty., 710 
F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir. 1983).  The only exception is when sex is a “bona fide 
occupational qualification” for the position.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 which bans discrimination on the basis of sex, 
antidiscrimination protection applies to everyone on the basis of the 
protected trait.  Under an asymmetrical law like the ADA, 
antidiscrimination protection applies only to a limited class—those 
identified as disadvantaged—and only on the basis of the disadvantaged 
“side” of the classification.  Antidiscrimination law is divided on this 
crucial question, with, for example, employment discrimination law treating 
race and sex symmetrically, and disability and age asymmetrically.8 
No law or scholarship explains, let alone justifies, the current divide in 
the design of antidiscrimination law, or its consequences.9  One might 
attempt to explain the divide based on varying levels of constitutional 
scrutiny.  The traits that are protected symmetrically are subject to 
heightened scrutiny,10 and some degree of symmetry might be demanded 
there.11  But this does not explain current law,12 nor, more importantly, does 
                                                
7 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, & 42 
U.S.C.).   
8 Compare McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 286-87 (1976) 
(holding that race discrimination protection is symmetrical under Title VII); Martinez, 710 
F.2d at 1104 (same for sex), with 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (making clear that the ADA is 
asymmetrical); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 667 (2004) (holding the 
same for federal age discrimination law).  
9 Scholars have only addressed the question piecemeal, focusing on one protected trait, 
see, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 
397, 398 (2000) (disability); Cary Franklin, The Antistereotyping Principle in 
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 104-06 (2010) (sex); 
Michael A. Stein, et al., Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 721-26 
(2014) (disability), or on one cause of action, see, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When 
Different Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs 
Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53 (1999) 
(Title VII’s proof standard for disparate treatment); Charles Sullivan, The World Turned 
Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1550-
55 (2004) (disparate impact under Title VII).   
10 Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
plurality opinion) (race classifications subject to heightened scrutiny); Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); (sex classifications subject to heightened 
scrutiny), with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) 
(disability classifications subject to rational basis review); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (age classifications subject to rational basis review). 
11 Because heightened scrutiny applies equally to malign and benign classifications, 
see Croson, 488 U.S. at 494, a law that treated advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
differently, even to help the latter, might not pass constitutional muster, especially for race 
classifications, which are subject to stricter scrutiny than sex classifications.  Compare 
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 493, 585-86 (2003) (suggesting that such a law could survive even under strict 
scrutiny after Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), upheld a facially classificatory 
regime), with Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1550-55 (suggesting that such a law might fail).  
See infra note 34 and accompanying text for further discussion.  Because this Article 
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it justify it, as constitutional treatment is not dispositive of the normative 
question of what the design of antidiscrimination law, including 
constitutional law, should be.   
While longstanding debates about affirmative action touch on the 
symmetry-asymmetry divide, they set up the choice as one between the 
dueling purposes of antidiscrimination law.  On the one side are the 
anticlassificationists, who oppose all uses of protected classifications, and 
favor a symmetrical ban on any use of a protected trait, whether the use of 
the protected trait harms a member of a disadvantaged or advantaged 
group.13  On the other side are the antisubordinationists, who oppose only 
those uses of a protected trait that harm the disadvantaged group, and thus 
favor an asymmetrical ban that would allow only members of the 
disadvantaged group to utilize the law.14  The narrow focus of this debate 
has wrongly rendered symmetry synonymous with the anticlassification 
view, and misses the full range of consequences of the choice between 
symmetry and asymmetry.   
This Article untethers the choice between symmetry and asymmetry 
from the stunted affirmative action debate.  It makes the case for symmetry 
on novel grounds, including antisubordination goals.  Before going further, 
a word about methodology is in order.  To make the analysis tractable, this 
Article focuses on one area of antidiscrimination law—federal employment 
discrimination law—which is by far the most common federal 
antidiscrimination claim.15  The volume of cases in this area provides 
                                                                                                                       
proposes more rather than less symmetry, it poses fewer constitutional concerns than 
current law.    
12 The Supreme Court and other courts read these traits to be protected symmetrically 
before it held that heightened scrutiny applied to all classifications on the basis of these 
traits, and relied not at all on constitutional arguments in doing so.  Compare, e.g., 
McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286-87 (holding that race discrimination protection is symmetrical 
on the basis of statutory text, legislative history, and administrative practice), with Croson, 
488 U.S. at 494 (applying heightened scrutiny to all race classifications).  And the 
Constitution does nothing to explain traits that are treated asymmetrically, as they are 
subject only to rational basis review, permitting either symmetrical or asymmetrical 
treatment.  See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (disability); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313  (age).  See 
infra notes 34-37, 41 and accompanying text for further discussion.  
13 See, e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights: The Legacy of 
Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984) (arguing that antidiscrimination requires elimination of 
classifications and thus favoring symmetrical standard that applies to all classifications). 
14 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 107 (1976) (arguing that antidiscrimination requires a sensitivity to whether a 
classification disadvantages a subordinated group and arguing for more asymmetry on this 
basis). 
15 See Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J. 
EMP. L. STUDS. 4, 5 & n.13 (2015) (documenting that litigation under “the employment 
[discrimination] statutes has constituted the largest fraction of the nonprisoner federal civil 
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substantial data for studying the impact of legal design.  Within 
employment discrimination law, I focus on four protected traits—
race/national origin,16 sex, age, and disability—which constitute the vast 
majority of claims,17 and divide evenly between symmetrical (race/national 
origin and sex) and asymmetrical (age and disability) treatment.18  
This Article’s case for symmetry is made on three grounds: purpose, 
practice, and politics.  As for purpose, the Article shows how, in contrast to 
the debates surrounding affirmative action, symmetry can serve 
antisubordination ends.  First, by providing universal protection, a 
symmetrical law can avoid one well-recognized problem of asymmetrical 
laws: that they make members of the protected group—the disadvantaged 
group—more expensive to employ, thereby counterproductively harming 
their employment prospects.19  Second, a symmetrical law more effectively 
combats subordinating stereotypes by allowing them to be challenged when 
they are exercised in mirror-image form against privileged groups.20  
Finally, even members of advantaged groups can face pockets of systematic 
disadvantage, for example, younger workers denied promotions,21 or men 
excluded from caring professions.22  Only a symmetrical law allows 
                                                                                                                       
docket”).  I address other areas of law, and whether the conclusions drawn from 
employment are generalizable, in infra Part III.C.2.   
16 I treat these traits together as it can be difficult to disentangle whether discrimination 
is on the basis of race, national origin, or both.  See EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 13 
(2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html#IIC 
(“[D]iscrimination based on physical traits or ancestry may be both national origin and 
racial discrimination.”).   
17 See EEOC, Charge Statistics, EEOC (last visited Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm.  This excludes the bases of 
religion, color, and genetic information, which are also protected by federal employment 
discrimination law, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (religion and color); id. § 2000ff-1(a) 
(genetic information), but make up only a small fraction of claims, see EEOC, supra 
(showing that religion claims make up approximately 3% of claims; color claims make up 
approximately 2% of claims; and genetic claims make up approximately .3% of claims).   
18 See sources cited supra note 8. 
19 See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 227 (2000); 
infra Part II.A.2.a.    
20 See Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2001) (male plaintiff 
claiming discrimination based on supervisor denying child-care leave because “there is no 
way [he] could be [the] primary care [giver]” unless his wife was “in a coma or dead,” 
thereby challenging stereotype of both male breadwinner and female caregiver); infra Part 
II.A.2.b. 
21 See, e.g., Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999) (twenty-
five-year-old demoted from vice president position after employer learned of his age). 
22 See, e.g., Evans v. Prinicipi, No. Civ. A 02-2258(GK), 2005 WL 485743, at *1 
(D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2005) (male nurse claiming sex discrimination after supervisor telling him 
that he “‘d[id]n’t belong here’”). 
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disadvantage to be challenged in all of its manifestations.23  As for practice, 
a symmetrical law avoids the need for the plaintiff to establish membership 
in the protected class at the outset of each case, a hurdle that has unduly 
restricted understandings of discrimination and plaintiffs’ ability to prove 
their claims.24  Moreover, the protected-class hurdle, which requires a 
judicial determination of a plaintiff’s identity, is increasingly out of place in 
an era where the likes of Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel Dolezal complicate 
static notions of protected class membership and necessitate a more fluid 
understanding of identity.25  As for politics, a symmetrical law that provides 
universal benefits is more likely to generate positive policy feedback that 
increases support for the law.26   
After setting forth the case for symmetry, this Article considers a move 
towards more symmetry in antidiscrimination law.  Weighing the benefits 
of symmetry with its potential costs, I conclude that, while the benefits vary 
by trait, a symmetrical approach is recommended for each trait.  None of the 
concerns critics might raise—undermining the expressive function of the 
law, increasing costs imposed by the law, or interfering with affirmative 
action or disparate impact—should trouble us.  In light of the significant 
benefits of symmetry, this Article proposes not only that currently 
asymmetrical law—the protections against disability and age 
discrimination—should be made symmetrical—but that even currently 
symmetrical law—the protections against race, national origin, and sex 
discrimination—should be made more symmetrical, and proposes how to do 
so.  Finally, the Article expands its focus, offering thoughts on how the 
analysis would apply to additional traits that are the subject of pending 
legislation—appearance and sexual orientation—and additional areas of 
law—education law, housing law, and constitutional law. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, this Article defines its 
key terms—symmetry and asymmetry—and explains how they map on to 
current law.  Part II catalogues the benefits of symmetry for the purpose, 
practice, and politics of antidiscrimination law.  After evaluating the 
benefits and costs of symmetry, Part III addresses the optimal level of 
symmetry, and says a few words about how the analysis of Part II would 
apply to additional protected traits and areas of law.  
 
I. SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY 
  
This Part introduces the symmetry-asymmetry design choice by 
                                                
23 See infra Part II.A.2.c. 
24  See infra Part II.B. 
25 See id. 
26 See infra Part II.C. 
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defining the constituent features of symmetry and asymmetry.  It sets forth a 
typology of protected traits—binary, discrete, and continuous—and 
explains how symmetry and asymmetry applies to each.  This Part then 
explains how these definitions map on to current law, which, among the 
four primary bases for claims—race/national origin, sex, age, and 
disability—splits evenly between symmetrical and asymmetrical 
protections.  
 
A.  Definitions and Typology 
 
An antidiscrimination law may adopt either a symmetrical or 
asymmetrical design.  Two features distinguish a symmetrical from an 
asymmetrical law: the direction of discrimination prohibited, and the scope 
of the protected class.  I illustrate these concepts using the example of sex 
discrimination.  As for direction, the law could ban discrimination on the 
basis of any sex, or on the basis of either female or male sex.  As for 
protected class, the law could protect everyone from discrimination on the 
basis of sex (a universal protected class), or it could limit protection to just 
women or just men (a limited protected class).  This Article uses the term 
symmetrical to describe an antidiscrimination law that does not limit the 
scope of persons who are protected on the basis of a given trait, nor does it 
limit the direction of discrimination prohibited.  This Article uses the term 
asymmetrical to describe an antidiscrimination law that limits the scope of 
persons who are protected on the basis of the trait, as well as the direction 
of discrimination prohibited.  
This Article applies this same terminology not only to binary 
classifications, like sex, but to classifications with multiple discrete 
permutations, and to classifications that fall along a continuous spectrum 
(see Table 1).  Binary protected traits are those in which the trait can be 
divided into two groups.  Traditionally at least, the sex classification divides 
persons into male and female.27  Discrete protected traits are those that 
                                                
27 This Article hews to the accepted usage of sex to describe a biological phenomenon 
and gender to describe a sociological expression.  Even on the biological level, it may be 
more accurate to view sex as a “lumpy” spectrum, with most persons clearly male or 
female, but with a small number who fall between these two categories, either 
phenotypically, as a result of ambiguous genitalia, or genetically, as a result of multiple or 
missing sex chromosomes.  See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and 
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 
YALE L.J. 1, 16 n.36 (1995); cf. Lee Ann Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1955, 1956 (2012).  At the sociological level, one conception of gender identity would 
view it as existing along a continuous spectrum from masculine to feminine, regardless of 
biological sex.  See Case, supra, at 18-28.  Another conception of gender identity would 
view it as discrete, with groupings of cis men, cis women, agender, bigender, gender-fluid, 
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contain multiple discrete groups within the classification.  Although each 
discrete group might exist along a spectrum, there are dividing lines that can 
be drawn between the multiple groupings that exist within the classification.  
Examples of discrete protected traits include race, national origin, and 
disability.  Race includes groupings of Asian, black, Native American, and 
white.  While there is a spectrum within each grouping of those who might 
identify as more or less black, or more or less Asian (e.g., someone who is 
multiracial), we can at least draw rough lines around the various races.  So 
too with national origin and disability.  Continuous protected traits are those 
in which the trait exists along a spectrum with no clear breaking points 
dividing the different permutations of the trait.  Age is a continuous 
protected trait.      
 
TABLE 1 
 
A law that banned discrimination against all persons on the basis of any 
race, whether Asian, black, Native American, or white, would be 
symmetrical.  A law that banned discrimination against only a subset of 
persons and only on the basis of black, Asian, and/or Native American race 
would be asymmetrical.  A law that banned discrimination against all 
persons on the basis of any age, whether young or old, would be 
symmetrical.  A law that banned discrimination only against a subset of 
                                                                                                                       
transgender, and so on.  See Debby Herbenick & Aleta Baldwin, What Each of Facebook’s 
51 New Gender Options Means, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 15, 2014, 5:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/15/the-complete-glossary-of-facebook-s-
51-gender-options.html.  Finally, the prevalence and increasing acceptance of 
transgenderism also complicates the male-female sex binary, with persons increasingly 
blurring the line.  I return to this point in discussing the practical consequences of the 
choice between symmetry and asymmetry, and specifically the difficulty of assessing 
whether a plaintiff is a member of the protected class, in infra Part II.B. 
 
Binary: Sex 
Male Female 
 
Discrete: Race, National Origin, Disability 
White Asian Native American Black 
British Italian Latino Arab 
No Disability Crohn’s Disease Deaf Cerebral Palsy 
 
Continuous: Age 
Young                                                                                                         Old  
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persons on the basis of old age would be asymmetrical. 
While symmetrical antidiscrimination laws take the protected trait as the 
relevant unit of analysis for determining unlawful discrimination, 
asymmetrical laws focus on a subset of the protected trait.  This subset with 
which an asymmetrical law is concerned is measured by societal 
disadvantage.28  When antidiscrimination laws are designed asymmetrically, 
they ban discrimination on the basis of the societally disadvantaged trait, 
and limit this protection to the subset of persons who are most likely to 
experience this societal disadvantage.  Racial and ethnic minorities, women, 
the elderly, and the disabled are the groups that have been viewed to have 
been burdened in the distribution of societal costs and benefits and thus 
worthy of protection under an asymmetrical law.  
The direction of protection and the scope of the protected class are 
linked both in theory and in practice.  Symmetrical laws adopt a universal 
protected class to effectuate their universal ban on discrimination on the 
basis of the protected trait.  If a law symmetrically bans discrimination on 
the basis of black race and on the basis of white race, to effectuate this ban, 
both black and white individuals need to be subject to its protections.  By 
contrast, asymmetrical laws adopt a limited protected class to effectuate 
their limited protections.  So a law that is meant to protect against 
discrimination only on the basis of black race would limit the protected 
class to black persons.  Indeed, at first blush, it would not make sense to 
permit a universal protected class here, as only black persons can be 
discriminated against on the basis of black race.  This means that 
asymmetrical laws must reach a definition of a protected class. 
I say at first blush because a white individual who was perceived as 
black could be a candidate for protection even under an asymmetrical law.  
It would be plausible then to disaggregate the scope of the protected class 
from the direction of discrimination protected.  While an antidiscrimination 
law that bans discrimination in only one direction but adopts a universal 
protected class is possible in theory, we do not see this in practice.29  
Because these features of symmetrical and asymmetrical laws are linked in 
practice, I treat them as such.  I return to a more detailed discussion of the 
possible disaggregation of these features when addressing the practical 
consequences of symmetry and asymmetry.30  
                                                
28 While in theory, an asymmetrical law could divide groups in any number of ways, in 
practice, they are divided in this way.  This is best understood in terms of an 
antisubordination reading of such laws, which is discussed at infra notes 57-58, 66-68 and 
accompanying text. 
29 Both the ADEA and ADA adopt limited protected classes.  See infra notes 41-52 
and accompanying text.     
30 See infra Part II.B. 
 THE CASE FOR SYMMETRY 11 
 
 
B.  Current Law 
 
Federal law provides symmetrical protection against employment 
discrimination on the basis of race,31 national origin,32 and sex.33  The 
Supreme Court held that Title VII was symmetrical in the context of race in 
a surprisingly brief analysis that turned not at all on constitutional 
scrutiny,34 but on statutory text,35 legislative history,36 and administrative 
                                                
31 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 285-87 (1976) 
(holding that white persons can sue for race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, despite the latter’s statutory text: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . 
. . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (indicating that 
national origin should be interpreted broadly to mean any country from which the person’s 
ancestors came). 
33 See, e.g., Martinez v. El Paso Cnty., 710 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing male 
plaintiff to raise sex discrimination claim).  Under Title VII, pregnancy discrimination is 
defined as a subset of sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).  The basic protection 
against pregnancy discrimination is symmetrical: both pregnant and non-pregnant workers 
are included within the protected class of individuals who may file suit and claim 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy status.  See Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (allowing non-pregnant workers to raise claim that they were 
disadvantaged on the basis of non-pregnancy).  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
allowed some amount of preferential treatment of pregnant as compared with non-pregnant 
workers.  Id. at 285 (holding that Title VII does not preempt a state law that mandates 
benefits for pregnant workers and not for non-pregnant workers because “Congress 
intended the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] to be a floor beneath which pregnancy 
disability benefits may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise”).  
34 Equal protection doctrine subjects race and national origin classifications to strict 
scrutiny, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
plurality opinion), and sex classifications to intermediate scrutiny, see Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).   A classification subject to strict scrutiny can 
survive only if it is “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling government interest.”  
Croson, 488 U.S. at 497, 507.  A classification subject to intermediate scrutiny can survive 
only if furthers “important governmental objectives” by means that are “substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives.”  Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  It is perhaps unsurprising that the Court reached the conclusion that Title 
VII was symmetrical without resort to the Constitution given that a dozen years would have 
to pass before the Court held that race classifications for benign purposes, such as an 
asymmetrical antidiscrimination law meant to benefit the subordinated race, are subject to 
the same strict scrutiny as classifications for malign purposes. Thus, the symmetrical 
reading of Title VII can only be explained as a matter of constitutional law in retrospect, 
and does not justify the design as a normative matter.   
35 McDonald, 427 U.S. at 278 (noting that Title VII’s “terms are not limited to 
discrimination against members of a particular race”). 
36 Id. at 280 (recounting “uncontradicted legislative history to the effect that Title VII 
was intended to ‘cover white men and white women and all Americans,’ and create an 
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practice.37   
It is worth spelling out what this symmetry means in practice.  For 
disparate treatment claims, any employee can bring a claim of intentional 
discrimination on the basis of any of the traits protected by Title VII.38  This 
means that whites can sue for race discrimination, men can sue for sex 
discrimination, and so on.  When it comes to disparate impact, there is an 
open question as to whether “reverse” claims are cognizable.39  Even if 
disparate impact is asymmetrical, this makes only a small dent in the 
overarching symmetry of Title VII, as there are few disparate impact cases, 
and even fewer in which plaintiffs prevail.40 
By contrast, employment discrimination law protects the traits of age 
and disability asymmetrically by protecting discrimination only in one 
direction, and only against a limited protected class.41  So even employer 
programs or policies that intentionally favor older employees or disabled 
employees are not subject to challenge under the ADEA or ADA.42 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) protects only 
employees who are at least forty years of age, and only discrimination 
against older workers who are disfavored as compared with younger 
workers.43  The protected class was limited by statute,44 and the direction of 
                                                                                                                       
‘obligation not to discriminate against whites’”) (internal citations omitted). 
37 Id. at 279-80 (noting that the EEOC “has consistently interpreted Title VII to 
proscribe racial discrimination in private employment against whites on the same terms as 
racial discrimination against non-whites”) (internal citations omitted). 
38  Id.  While anyone can raise a claim under Title VII, note that not all courts apply 
the same standard of proof to “reverse” disparate treatment claims as they do to standard 
disparate treatment claims.  For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 323-31 and 
accompanying text. 
39 See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1506-08 (arguing that the purposes of the doctrine 
suggest that they should not be, but that an asymmetrical approach would raise 
constitutional concerns).  For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 332-36 and 
accompanying text.  
40 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?,  53 UCLA L. 
REV. 701, 735, 738-40 (2006) (finding that in the span of six years, there were only 171 
reported disparate impact cases decided by district courts, and documenting low success 
rates of these claims).  
41  The Constitution plays little to no role in this design choice.  Both of these traits are 
subject only to rational basis review.  See sources cited supra note 10.  This means that a 
law that classifies on the basis of either of these traits is permissible so long as it is 
“rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).   Therefore, a symmetrical or asymmetrical law for 
either of these traits would pass constitutional muster so long as there was some minimum 
justification for the design choice.    
42 See Christopher J. Kuczynski, Assistant Legal Counsel, ADA & ADEA: Hiring 
Practices, EEOC (2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2012/ada_adea_hiring_practices.html.  
43 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. 
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protection was limited later by the Supreme Court.45  After concluding that 
the ADEA’s text was ambiguous,46 the Court relied on the legislative 
history, the purpose of the law, and the context in which it was passed to 
decide that the ADEA prohibits discrimination only on the basis of old 
age.47  
The ADA also protects against discrimination on the basis of disability 
asymmetrically, meaning that it protects against discrimination only on the 
basis of the presence of a disability, rather than the absence of one.48  The 
ADA limits its protected class to one of three groups: those who have an 
actual disability, those who are “regarded as” disabled, and those who have 
a “record of” disability.49  This definition has been notoriously difficult to 
satisfy.50  The ADA also defines discrimination to include an employer’s 
                                                                                                                       
44 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)(1) (limiting the protections of the ADEA “to individuals who are 
at least 40 years of age”). 
45 Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 591 (2004) (employees aged 
forty to forty-nine claiming that they were disadvantaged as compared with older 
employees by reduction in health benefits that applied only to those with later retirement 
dates). 
46 Id. at 586 (determining that “‘discrimination . . . because of [an] individual’s age,’” 
could be interpreted to ban discrimination on the basis either of old age, or on the basis of 
any age) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)).   
47 See id. at 587 (noting that the Department of Labor report that underlies the ADEA 
“was devoid of any indication that the Secretary had noticed unfair advantages accruing to 
older workers at the expense of their juniors”); id. at 589 (“[F]rom the voluminous records 
of the hearings, we have found . . . nothing suggesting that any workers were registering 
complaints about discrimination in favor of their seniors”); id. (“The findings stress the 
impediments suffered by older workers. . . .”); id. at 591 (“[C]ommon experience” 
confirms that discrimination against younger workers is not “a social problem requir[ing] a 
federal statute to place a younger worker in parity with an older one.”).  But see id. at 602 
(Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J.) (reasoning that the plain language of the 
ADEA dictates a symmetrical reading of the law).  
48 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (“Nothing in this chapter shall provide the basis for a claim by 
an individual without a disability that the individual was subject to discrimination because 
of the individual’s lack of disability.”).   
49 Id. § 12102(1) (“The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual—(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of 
such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”).   
50 As for actual disability, many scholars agree that “courts have inappropriately 
applied a restrictive definition of ‘disability’ to squelch ADA cases at the summary 
judgment stage.”  Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 398; see also Ruth Colker, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99–100 
(1999); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability 
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of 
Disability, 42 VILL L. REV. 409, 536 (1997).  Although recent amendments to the ADA 
were meant to ease this burden, scholars have found that many courts continue to construe 
actual disability claims quite narrowly.  See, e.g., Stein, et al., supra note 9, at 721-26; 
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failure to provide a reasonable accommodation,51 but only to those who are 
actually disabled or who have a record of disability (and not to those 
“regarded as” disabled).52   
 
II. THE BENEFITS OF SYMMETRY 
 
This Part sets forth the underappreciated benefits of symmetry along 
three dimensions: purpose, practice and politics.  It begins with a 
reconfiguration of the choice between symmetry and asymmetry, showing 
how a symmetrical law can further not only anticlassification purposes, but 
also antisubordination purposes.  It next turns to the practical implications 
of a symmetrical or asymmetrical design, and explains how symmetry 
avoids problems that arise from a limited protected class, which complicates 
the discrimination inquiry and narrows the available theories of 
discrimination and which plaintiffs may proceed.  Finally, this Part 
addresses the politics of legal design, and argues that a symmetrical law will 
generate greater support for antidiscrimination law.         
Two points are worth noting before proceeding further.  First, I 
intentionally sidestep the question of which traits should be protected by 
law, and instead simply presume that there are some traits that should 
qualify.53  Whenever we find a trait worthy of special protection, we are 
                                                                                                                       
Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes under the ADA 
Amendments Act, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2065–66 (2013). 
As for “regarded as” disabled, the ADA does not permit anyone to bring this claim, but 
narrows it to those who have an actual or perceived substantially limiting impairment that 
is not minor and transitory.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (defining “regarded as” disabled as 
having “an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the 
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity”); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) 
(excepting impairments that are “transitory and minor,” and defining a “transitory 
impairment” as one  “with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less”).  Courts’ 
unduly restrictive approach to interpreting the definition of disability extends to the 
“regarded-as” prong.  See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” 
Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587 (1997).  Again, despite 
statutory amendments, many courts continue to construe regarded-as disability claims 
narrowly.  See, e.g., Stein, et al., supra note 9, at 726-27; Befort, supra, at 2063; Deborah 
Widiss, Still Kickin’ After All These Years: Sutton and Toyota As Shadow Precedents, 63 
DRAKE L. REV. 919, 942-46 (2015) (documenting how courts continue to apply restrictive 
definition of “regarded as” prong even post-amendment). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (including within the definition of discrimination “not 
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability” unless “the accommodation would impose 
an undue hardship”).   
52 Id. § 12201(h). 
53 A variety of considerations are thought to be relevant to whether a treat warrants 
special protection in law.  See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 
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faced with whether to protect the trait symmetrically or asymmetrically.  
Second, each of the benefits discussed below does not apply equally across 
protected traits.  In this Part, I rely on examples across protected traits to 
make clear the benefit at hand.  In the next Part, I address these benefits on 
a trait-by-trait basis to evaluate how each trait fares under this analysis.      
 
A.  Purpose 
 
Two primary theories underlie antidiscrimination law: the 
anticlassification theory and the antisubordination theory.54  Under an 
anticlassification view, the wrong of discrimination is in “classify[ing] 
people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category: 
for example, their race.”55  The most familiar instantiation of this view is 
one of so-called “trait-blindness,” which is skeptical of classifications made 
on the basis of a protected trait, even when classifications are made for 
benign purposes.56  The antisubordination view, by contrast, maintains that 
the wrong of discrimination is in “practices that enforce the secondary 
social status of historically oppressed groups.”57  An antisubordinationist 
regime would accept and even encourage classifications that expand 
opportunities for members of traditionally subordinated groups.58 
I do not seek to choose between the anticlassification and 
antisubordination rationales for antidiscrimination law.  While symmetry 
has been aligned with the anticlassification perspective, my aim to show 
how antisubordination purposes can also be furthered by a symmetrical 
design.  First, by offering universal protection, a symmetrical law avoids a 
                                                                                                                       
(1972) (holding that immutable characteristics, or “accidents of birth,” should be protected 
because they are unrelated to individual responsibility); United States v. Carolene Prods., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that protection should apply when “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”); In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008) (holding that protection should apply to traits that are 
“so integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate 
or change [them] in order to avoid discriminatory treatment”).  In infra Part III.C.1, I 
address additional traits that have been protected in some jurisdictions. 
54  See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordiantion?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003).     
55 See id. at 10. 
56 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
748 (2007) (in the context of a school assignment program that considered race to promote 
integration, stating that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race”); Reynolds, supra note 13, at 998 (advocating for 
“colorblindness”).    
57 Balkin & Siegel, supra note 54, at 9. 
58 See Fiss, supra note 14, at 159. 
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key shortcoming of asymmetrical laws: that they increase the cost of 
employing members of the disadvantaged group, thereby damaging their 
employment prospects, precisely contrary to the goal of such laws.  Second, 
stereotypes that hold subordinated groups back are exercised not only 
against subordinated workers themselves, but also, in mirror-image form, 
against privileged groups.  Failing to permit privileged groups to challenge 
these stereotypes limits the law’s ability to dismantle them.  Finally, the 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups cannot always be neatly divided, and 
only a symmetrical law permits the flexibility to combat subordination in its 
heterogeneous manifestations.  I first briefly explain how symmetry furthers 
anticlassification objectives, and then set forth the novel case for how 
symmetry can also further antisubordination objectives.   
 
1. Anticlassification 
 
The primary concern underlying the anticlassification view is with 
treating an individual as an individual rather than on the basis of a protected 
trait.  The anticlassification view has long been associated with a 
symmetrical regime, because the only way to challenge all classifications on 
the basis of a protected trait is to allow claims for discrimination by both 
“sides” of the protected trait.59  Earlier justifications for the 
anticlassification view focused on the unfairness of limiting important 
opportunities on the basis of a protected trait, whether it is to the 
disadvantaged or advantaged side.60  It is obvious that symmetry is 
necessary to avoid this harm of unfairness.  If the nature of the trait is such 
that relying on it in any way to distribute important benefits is unfair, then 
avoiding this unfairness requires a law that bans classifications on the basis 
of the trait symmetrically, allowing members of both disadvantaged and 
                                                
59 Note that although anticlassificationists would, at a minimum, support a symmetrical 
antidiscrimination regime, the anticlassification approach and the symmetry approach are 
not identical.  While anticlassification absolutists would ban all classifications on the basis 
of a protected trait, symmetry would simply require that whatever doctrines apply to one 
group should apply equally across all groups.  So whereas anticlassification absolutists 
would ban affirmative action and disparate impact, symmetry absolutists would argue that 
affirmative action and disparate impact should be available to all on equal terms.  I return 
to this distinction in infra Part III.B.1.   
60 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality 
opinion) (critiquing affirmative action plan because of unfairness based on harms to 
“innocent people”); Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (Powell, J., 
plurality opinion) (“One should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of . . .  a system 
of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic origin.”); Reva B. 
Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. 
Texas, in RACE & REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 37 (Michael Rogin & 
Robert Post eds., 1998).  
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advantaged groups to challenge discriminatory classifications.   
Later iterations of the anticlassification purpose focus more on the 
stereotyping harms that classifications impose on disadvantaged groups.61  
Classifying on the basis of a protected trait reinforces the salience of group 
membership rather than the qualities of the individual in her own right.62  
Here, too, a symmetrical design that allows employees from either “side” of 
the trait to challenge classifications is necessary to avoid these harms.  For 
an employer to disfavor white employees, the employer must distinguish 
employees on the basis of race, thereby making race salient to the employer.  
And the justification for the race-based distinction must rely on some 
feature believed to be common to all members of a particular race, which 
reinforces stereotypical thinking rather than individualized assessments.63  
Under asymmetrical laws, these decisions would never be challenged.  
While these concerns have been raised primarily in the context of 
affirmative action programs, we can see broader application in the choice 
between symmetry and asymmetry.  For example, in the context of 
disability, technology firms have begun to prefer individuals with autism for 
positions that require high levels of concentration and attention to detail, 
like software testing and data conversion.64  Targeting workers based on 
their disability rather than their skills relies on stereotypes.  While these 
stereotypes—such as mathematical or other technical skills—may seem 
benign, they reinforce stereotypical thinking about the abilities and 
characteristics of someone with that disability.  So these workers may be 
assumed to be skilled at certain tasks, but they may also be assumed to have 
the negative traits that go along with their condition, such as problems 
                                                
61 See Siegel, supra note 60, at 38 (explaining that later equal protection jurisprudence 
described the harm of racial classifications to be how they “can injure racial minorities”).   
62 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007) (explaining that racial classifications “reinforce the belief, held by too many for too 
much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin”); Croson, 
488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (failing to apply strict scrutiny 
to all racial classifications “effectively assures that race will always be relevant in 
American life”); Burgdorf, supra note 50, at 525 (“The classification . . . of people with 
disabilities as a distinctive status group in society is not merely a cause of discrimination, it 
is the ‘wellspring’ and the ‘essence’ of discrimination on the basis of disability.”). 
63 In the context of affirmative action, there has been a particular concern that such 
programs stigmatize their intended beneficiaries.  See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (explaining 
that “classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm”); Metro Broad., Inc. v. 
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that race-based 
affirmative action program justified by the view that a minority is “likely to provide [a] 
distinct perspective, impermissibly value[d] individuals” based on a presumption that 
“persons think in a manner associated with their race”) (internal quotations marks omitted).  
64 See Federico-O’Murchu, supra note 3.    
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socializing and associating with their supervisors and coworkers.65  The 
anticlassification perspective judges these classifications as harmful, despite 
their benign purpose, precisely because they reinforce this type of group-
based thinking.  Only a symmetrical law allows these classifications to be 
challenged.  
 
2. Antisubordination 
 
The antisubordination rationale views the purpose of antidiscrimination 
law to be the eradication of policies that contribute to the subordination of 
disadvantaged groups.66  Note that the focus is on individuals as members 
of groups rather than as individuals.67  Unlike advocates of the 
anticlassification view, the antisubordination camp has advocated for a 
more asymmetrical approach to antidiscrimination law.68  In this Section, I 
argue instead that symmetry better furthers the goal of antisubordination by 
reducing the negative distributive consequences of employment mandates 
that protect only the disadvantaged group; by allowing interlocking 
stereotypes of advantaged and disadvantaged groups to be challenged from 
both sides; and by recognizing systematic pockets of disadvantage that even 
privileged groups face.  
 
a. Costs of Mandates 
 
Many in the antisubordination camp assume that a law protecting the 
subordinated group will have positive distributive effects on these workers, 
in terms of raising employment levels and wages.  However, mandating 
protection for an identifiable group of workers can backfire, harming the 
disadvantaged group that the law is meant to help.  This is because an 
asymmetrical mandate makes the protected group of workers more 
expensive to employ, which can lead to reduced employment levels and 
wages for these workers.69  A symmetrical law can reduce or eliminate 
                                                
65 See id.    
66 For additional examples of antisubordination theories, see KENNETH L. KARST, 
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989); DERRICK 
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-
45 (1987).  
67 Indeed, Fiss calls the antisubordination view the “group disadvantaging principle.”  
Fiss, supra note 14, at 157.  
68 See id. at 159.    
69 See Jolls, supra note 19, at 227.  While Jolls makes the point in the context of 
accommodation mandates, antidiscrimination mandates impose many of the same costs on 
employers, including the critical cost of litigation.  See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Angrist, 
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these negative distributive consequences, better fulfilling the 
antisubordination purpose. 
In a classic article, Professor Lawrence Summers formalized a 
framework for understanding the effects of employer mandates directed to 
workers as a whole, which I refer to as universal mandates.70  Under a 
supply-and-demand framework of the labor market, Summers showed that 
there is little hope that these mandates redistribute resources from 
employers to employees.  Assume that employers are required to bear the 
entire cost of the mandated benefit.  This will have effects on both the 
demand and supply of labor.  As for demand, employers will demand less 
labor because the mandate makes labor more costly (reflected in a shift of 
the labor demand curve D0 to D1 in Figure 1).  As for supply, employees 
will supply more labor because the mandated benefit is a form of additional 
(typically nonmonetary) compensation.  The labor supply curve will shift by 
the amount that employees value the benefit (reflected in a shift from S0 to 
either of the S1 curves).  This leads to an equilibrium of reduced wages, but 
employment levels that may increase or decrease, depending on how 
employees value the benefit.  The shift to S1’ reflects a low employee 
valuation; the shift to S1’’ reflects a high employee valuation.  Either way, 
systematic redistribution from employer to employees is unlikely, because 
“the more a mandated benefit is worth to workers, the more wages will 
decline when it is provided.”71 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
Consequences of Employment Protection?  The Case of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 919-20 (2001); Joanna N. Lahey, International Comparison of 
Age Disicrimination Laws, 32 RES. ON AGING 679, 680 (2010); Gillian Lester, A Defense of 
Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 55 (2005).  Indeed, Jolls herself suggests 
in the context of the ADA that it may be the litigation costs associated with the law’s 
antidiscrimination mandate, rather than the cost of accommodations, that lead to the 
consequences she describes.  See Jolls, supra note 19, at 277.  Therefore, we can expect 
similar effects with any employment discrimination law, regardless of whether it requires 
accommodations.  See infra notes 112-13 (discussing the negative distributive 
consequences of the ADEA, even though it has no accommodation mandate).  
70 See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. 
ECON. REV. 177, 180-81 (1989).  While this framework remains widely accepted, some 
economists have questioned it based on empirical evidence that mandates do not always 
have this effect.  See John Donohue, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of 
Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2001) 
(collecting citations). 
71 Dwight R. Lee, Why Workers Should Want Mandated Benefits to Lower Their 
Wages, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 401, 402 (1996); see also Jolls, supra note 19, at 237 (“As the 
value of the mandated benefit rises, the amount of the cost that is shifted to workers in the 
form of reduced wages rises as well, limiting the possibility for distributive gains.”). 
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FIGURE 1 
 
As Professor Christine Jolls has explained, this analysis changes when a 
mandate affects only a subset of workers rather than all workers.72  
Mandates that protect a limited class typically also bar employers from 
discriminating against the protected class in hiring and wages.  In theory, 
then, Summers’s predictions should not hold, because it would be unlawful 
for employers to respond to the mandate by failing to hire employees from 
the protected group or pay them less.73  But Jolls recognizes that the actual 
distributive consequences of a mandate depends on whether it effectively 
constrains employers from discriminating against the protected group in 
hiring or pay.74  If it does, the law will have the intended positive 
distributive effect on the protected group; if it does not, the law will have a 
negative distributive effect on the protected group.75   
                                                
72 See Jolls, supra note 19, at 240-53. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 254-61. 
75 Id. 
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Jolls explains that because of the ineffectiveness of protections against 
hiring discrimination,76 we can assume that, in the general case, only the 
ban on wage discrimination constrains.77  If wage but not hiring 
discrimination bans are effective, the employment levels of the protected 
workers will fall.78  But in cases of significant occupational segregation, 
such as by sex, we can expect that hiring but not wage discrimination bans 
are effective.79  In such cases, we can instead expect antidiscrimination 
mandates to leave the employment level of the protected group relatively 
unaffected, but to reduce wages.80  Those interested in the antisubordination 
goals of employment discrimination law would be quite rightly concerned 
about a law with either of these negative distributive consequences.   
Note that these consequences turn on the protected trait being 
discernible to the employer.  If a trait is highly visible, like sex, 
decisionmakers can easily make hiring or pay decisions on the basis of the 
trait (so long as the law is not constraining).  If a trait is not highly visible, 
this is made more difficult.  When a protected trait is truly invisible, even an 
asymmetrical antidiscrimination mandate will not have the negative 
consequence on the protected group that Professor Jolls posits.  Of the traits 
under analysis, disability is the most affected by visibility, as some 
instances of disability are invisible or difficult to discern.81  While this 
impairs decisionmakers’ ability to discriminate perfectly, they can still 
discriminate against those with discernible disabilities, in which case Jolls’s 
analysis applies.82  I follow Jolls in assuming that a sufficiently large 
number of disabilities are visible such that an asymmetrical law would lead 
to negative employment consequences for disabled persons.83 
It is important to note that Jolls applies her analysis of targeted 
accommodation mandates even to symmetrical laws that cover all workers 
                                                
76 Id. at 263-71; see also Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time that You Know: The 
Shortcomings of Ignorance as Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an 
Information-Shifting Model, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 125-26 (2007) (documenting 
reasons why bans on hiring discrimination are ineffective). 
77 Jolls, supra note 19, at 228.   
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 268-70.  When an occupation is filled with primarily women, employers 
will continue to hire women, but will be able to pay them less because they will have few 
male comparators that would allow them to prove a wage discrimination claim.   
80 See id. at 290-99. 
81 Many physical conditions that might be considered disabilities are not visible, 
including diabetes, high blood pressure, epilepsy, HIV/AIDS, and cystic fibrosis, as are a 
host of mental disabilities. 
82 Note that the ADA bans inquiries about ability and disability at the hiring stage 
except as to the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.  42 U.S.C. § 
12112(d)(2). 
83 See Jolls, supra note 19, at 273-82.   
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if such laws are used disproportionately by one group.  This means that she 
includes as an accommodation mandate the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA),84 even though it is symmetrical, because women use the law’s 
parental leave accommodation more than men.85  In so doing, Jolls relies on 
a rational actor model that assumes not only that employers know the law, 
but that they know the usage of the law, and incorporate this knowledge 
into their decisionmaking.  Under this view, so long as one group 
disproportionately relies on an antidiscrimination mandate, the fact that the 
mandate is formally symmetrical is not relevant in analyzing the employer’s 
response to the law and the resulting distributive consequences.   
Here is where I part company with Jolls.  I assume instead a model of 
bounded rationality, under which information is costly,86 and “human 
cognitive abilities are not infinite.”87  The perceptions of boundedly rational 
decisionmakers then are shaped by limited access to information and 
subject to cognitive shortcomings that bias the processing of information.88  
Under this view, a symmetrical as compared with an asymmetrical law can 
prompt different employer responses, and thus can have different 
distributive consequences, even if one group of employees 
disproportionately uses the law.  If a decisionmaker believes that members 
of the advantaged group make equivalent or substantial use of a 
symmetrical law, regardless of whether they actually do, this is enough to 
reduce or eliminate the negative distribute consequences.   
Importantly, this beneficial impact of symmetry does not turn on an 
employer believing that the advantaged and disadvantaged groups use the 
                                                
84 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-54. 
85 Jolls, supra note 19, at 232, 290.  While more women take FMLA leave following 
the birth of a child, the FMLA also allows employees to take leave to care for older 
children, spouses, and parents, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), as well as for their own medical 
conditions, id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).  Between these forms of leave, FMLA leave is now taken 
in almost equal measure by women and men: 56% women and 44% men.  Nat’l P’ship for 
Women & Families, A Look at the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2012 FMLA Surveys, 
NAT’L P’SHIP (Feb. 2013), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-
family/fmla/dol-fmla-survey-key-findings-2012.pdf.  
86 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. L. 211, 214 (1995). 
87 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998).  Given that Jolls’s later research 
includes some of the seminal work incorporating behavioral economics into legal analysis, 
see generally id., she may not disagree with my application of bounded rationality here. 
Her earlier work simply does not consider these arguments.   
88 Id. (describing how such shortcomings mean that “actual decisions” under bounded 
rationality “often violate the axioms of expected utility theory”); Eisenberg, supra note 86, 
at 214 (explaining that “human rationality is normally bounded by limited information and 
limited information processing” and thus that “actors will adopt selective search and 
processing procedures”). 
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antidiscrimination law in exactly equal measure.  Symmetry can mitigate 
the negative distributive consequences of an antidiscrimination law so long 
as the employer believes that the advantaged group uses the law, even if 
with less frequency than the disadvantaged group.  Any use by the 
advantaged group will increase the cost of employing members of that 
group, closing the gap between the cost of employing the advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups, and thereby reducing the disincentive to hire the 
disadvantaged group.  So even if an employer does not believe, for 
example, that white employees are as likely to sue under Title VII as black 
employees, the benefit of symmetry is not fully lost so long as the employer 
believes that whites make some use of the law.  The amount of the benefit 
derived from symmetry will turn on the employer’s perception of how often 
the advantaged group relies on the law, with a perception of more 
substantial usage associated with a more substantial benefit.     
Despite bounded rationality, there is good reason to believe that 
decisionmakers would be informed about the basic provisions of the law 
that governs their decisionmaking, including whether a law is symmetrical 
or asymmetrical.  This information is easy to acquire, and would likely be 
part of an employer’s equal employment opportunity training.89  By 
contrast, decisionmakers are far less likely to have information about the 
actual usage of symmetrical employment discrimination laws.  As an initial 
matter, this data is not easily accessible.90  And because making hiring or 
pay decisions on the basis of protected traits is unlawful, the employer is 
unlikely to include this data or guidance on how to act on it in any employer 
policy or training session.  Rather, the decision not to hire someone or to 
pay them less on the basis of a protected identity trait is likely to be made in 
a decentralized way based on each decisionmaker’s perception of the 
probability of a lawsuit or other costs associated with employing members 
of the different groups.  It is unlikely that an individual decisionmaker 
acting in this capacity will access data about the probability of a lawsuit or 
other costs.  Expensive information-search is made even more costly here 
where discovering the fact of the search could serve as evidence of 
discrimination that would subject the employer to liability.  Finally, as a 
general matter, decisionmakers tend to disregard probability when making a 
                                                
89 See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (discussing the role of employer 
practices, including such trainings, in employment discrimination law).   
90 The data is not available on the EEOC’s website.  It took even this employment 
discrimination law scholar some time to find current statistics.  In 2012, approximately 
4,000 of the 33,000 race discrimination claims were filed by white individuals and 
approximately 6,300 of the 30,000 sex discrimination claims were filed by men.  See Katie 
Kuehner-Hebert, How to Avoid Reverse Discrimination, TALENT MGMT. (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://www.talentmgt.com/articles/how-to-avoid-reverse-discrimination. 
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decision under uncertainty.91  Therefore, information about actual usage of 
symmetrical laws will not be determinative of how employers respond to 
antidiscrimination mandates.     
Instead, these decisions will depend on how decisionmakers perceive 
the usage of the law.92  The perception of the usage of antidiscrimination 
law will differ by protected trait.  One factor that matters is the perception 
of how often the advantaged group faces discrimination.  For age, this is 
likely to lead to a perception of significant usage of antidiscrimination law 
by young workers.  Decisionmakers will be aware of the generally low 
status accorded younger workers.93  Because decisionmakers are either 
young themselves or were once young, they are likely to be familiar with 
the stereotypes that younger workers face, and the challenges these 
stereotypes impose.94  Indeed, less than half of younger workers believe that 
they are treated fairly on the job,95 and younger workers are more likely to 
report experiencing age-related prejudice than older workers.96   
Another factor that affects perception is media attention, and for this 
reason, decisionmakers would also likely perceive a significant volume of 
suits raised by men.   Discrimination suits by men have been on the rise, 
accounting now for 20% of sex discrimination claims.97  But more than the 
actual number of suits, the media attention to this increase in litigation 
matters.98  Given the everyday nature of sex discrimination against women, 
                                                
91 See JONATHAN BARRON, THINKING AND DECIDING 353 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the 
phenomenon of “neglect of probability” and conditions under which it holds).   
92 We can expect that decionmakers’ perception will approximate public perception.  
Given that human resources managers or EEO compliance officers are not typically making 
routine hiring and pay decisions, it is unlikely that decisionmakers will be systematically 
more informed than the average person. 
93 See Graham Snowdon, Young and Older People Experience Age Discrimination at 
Work, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2012 10:05 
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/jan/16/young-older-people-age-
discrimination-work  (citing study finding that workers in their forties are viewed as having 
the highest status, while workers in their twenties are viewed as lower status than workers 
in their seventies). 
94 See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text. 
95 See Stephanie Armour, Young Workers Say Their Age Holds Them Back, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 7, 2003 11:20 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2003-
10-07-reverseage_x.htm (citing survey finding that just 44% of employees ages eighteen to 
twenty-four believe they are treated fairly).   
96 See Snowdon, supra note 93 (citing research finding those under twenty-five are at 
least twice as likely to have experienced age discrimination as other age groups). 
97 See Kuehner-Hebert, supra note 90.   
98 See Alice Gomstyn, Sexual Harassment Claims by Men Growing, ABC NEWS (Mar. 
26, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/TheLaw/sexual-harassment-claims-men-
growing-equal/story?id=10198753.  The Associated Press, Workplace Sexual Harassment 
Claims by Men Are on the Rise, DAILY NEWS (Mar. 4, 2010, 11:32 AM), 
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suits brought by men garner outsize attention, as we can see by the publicity 
afforded to a variety of claims that men bring: challenges to discriminatory 
family-leave policies,99 sexual harassment,100 and exclusions based on 
customer preferences.101  Because of the availability heuristic,102 media 
attention has been known to bias our predictive capacities,103 making 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/workplace-sexual-harrassment-claims-men-rise-
article-1.170550. 
99 See, e.g., Jennifer O’Neill, Meet the Man Who Sued His Boss to Spend More Time 
with His Kids, YAHOO (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/parenting/meet-the-man-
who-sued-his-boss-to-spend-more-time-112737108717.html; Rich Calder, Man Sues 
Employer for Alleged Firing over Paternity Leave, NEW YORK POST (Apr. 23, 2014, 8:56 
PM), http://nypost.com/2014/04/23/man-sues-employer-for-alleged-firing-over-paternity-
leave; Today: Male CNN Reporter Sues Over Parental Leave Policy (NBC television 
broadcast Nov. 11, 2013), available at http://www.today.com/video/today/53520438. 
100 See, e.g., Howard Koplowitz, Texas Man Wins Sexual Harassment Case Against 
Female Boss: Jury Awards James Gist $567K in Pam Matranga Case, INT’L BUS. TRIB. 
(Mar. 24, 2014, 10:39 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/texas-man-wins-sexual-harassment-
case-against-female-boss-jury-awards-james-gist-567k-pam-matranga; Dave Jamieson, 
LensCrafters Settles Female-on-Male Sexual Harassment Case, HUFFINGTON POST (June 
20, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/lenscrafters-settles-
fema_n_880709.html; Andrea Chang, Cheesecake Factory Sued by Male Workers, L.A. 
TIMES (July 11, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/11/business/fi-cheesecake11; 
Gomstyn, supra note 98; The Associated Press, supra note 98; Evan Tahmincioglu, Male 
Sexual Harassment Is Not a Joke, NBC NEWS (July 10, 2007, 9:49 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19536167/ns/business-careers/t/male-sexual-harassment-not-
joke/#.Vcifm2RVikp; Henry Weinstein & Lisa Girion, Gay Man’s Sexual Harassment 
Lawsuit Ruled Worthy of Trial, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2002), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/25/local/me-harass25. 
101  See, e.g., Brittany Bronson, Money, Sex, and Las Vegas Pool Parties, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 12, 2015, at SR11, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/opinion/sunday/money-sex-and-las-vegas-pool-
parties.html (referring to lawsuits brought by men challenging female hiring preferences at 
Las Vegas resorts); Nicole Pasulka, Men are Suing Ruby Tuesday Over Sexism, YAHOO 
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2015, 7:49 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/men-suing-ruby-tuesday-over-
sexism-may-actually-004903899.html; Robert Jablon, Lawry’s Settles Men’s Sex 
Discrimination Suit, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2009, 5:20 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20091102/us-lawry-s-gender-discrimination; 
Texas Man Settles Discrimination Lawsuit Against Hooters for Not Hiring Male Waiters, 
FOX NEWS (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/04/21/texas-man-settles-
discrimination-lawsuit-against-hooters-for-not-hiring-male.html.   
102 See Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 87, at 1477 (explaining that “the 
availability heuristic—in which the frequency of some event is estimated by judging how 
easy it is to recall other instances of this type—leads us to erroneous conclusions”). 
103 See Karen Riddle, Always on My Mind: Exploring How Frequent, Recent, and 
Vivid Television Portrayals Are Used in the Formation of Social Reality Judgments, 13 
MEDIA PSYCH. 155 (2010) (finding that more frequent viewing of violent media led 
subjects to give higher estimates of the prevalence of crime); L.J. Shrun, Media 
Consumption and Perceptions of Social Reality, in MEDIA EFFECTS 69, 72-76 (Jennings 
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decisionmakers likely to perceive men to be significant users of a 
symmetrical sex discrimination law.   
As for race, a decisionmaker might also perceive whites to use 
employment discrimination law based on the perception of the prevalence 
of so-called “reverse” race discrimination.  White Americans now view 
anti-white bias as more prevalent and a bigger societal problem than anti-
black bias.104  Americans overestimate the impact of affirmative action on 
historically advantaged groups, supporting a popular conception that white 
workers are frequently harmed by such policies, which give rise to reverse 
discrimination lawsuits.105  This perception is not limited to formal 
affirmative action policies, but to other forms of reverse discrimination as 
well.106  The perception of these types of lawsuits is likely to be all the more 
skewed by the salience of these issues in the media and the public 
generally,107 as well as by large damages awards.108  
                                                                                                                       
Bryant & Dolf Zillman eds., 2002) (collecting studies finding this effect and explaining it 
as the impact of media attention on perceptions of frequency, recency, and vividness); S. 
Lichtenstein, et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 6 J. EXP. PSYCH. 551, 551 (1978) 
(finding that 80% of subjects estimated death from accident more likely than death from 
stroke, even though strokes cause 85% more death than accidents, and attributing this error 
in part to media attention). 
104 Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game 
That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCH. SCI. 215, 215-16 (2011). 
105 See Carol R. Goforth, ‘What Is She?’ How Race Matters and Why It Shouldn't, 46 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 75 (1996) (noting that the perception that white males have been denied 
equal opportunities “has become a cause celebre”); Brian S. Lowery, et al., Concern for the 
In-Group and Opposition to Affirmative Action, 90 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 961 (2006) 
(finding that opposition to affirmative action is driven by desire to avoid harm to whites); 
Scott Plous, Ten Myths About Affirmative Action, 52 J. SOC. ISSUES 25 (2003) (listing as 
commonly believed myth that whites are widely adversely affected by affirmative action); 
Ronald Walters, Affirmative Action and the Politics of Concept Appropriation, 38 HOW. 
L.J. 587, 604 (1995) (noting claims that “some white males suffer a disadvantage from the 
implementation of affirmative action laws to such a degree that they have become a new 
‘ o p p r e s s e d  c l a s s ” ’ ) . 
106 By the 1990s, more than 70% of whites were convinced that reverse discrimination 
was a rampant problem, see C.E. “Chuck” Williams, Affirmative Action Doesn't Involve 
Quotas/Initiative 200--Preference or Prejudice, THE COLUMBIAN, Nov. 1, 1998, at B11, 
and by the 2000s, whites viewed racism against whites as more common and a bigger 
problem than racism against blacks, see Norton & Sommers, supra note 104, at 216; see 
generally Anne Laurent, The Great Divide, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, Apr. 1, 1996 
(discussing the growing perception among whites that they are wrongfully denied positions 
or promotions because of their race).   
107 See RORIE SPILL SOLBERG & ERIC N. WALTENBURG , THE MEDIA, THE COURT, AND 
MISREPRESENTATION: THE NEW MYTH OF THE COURT 66-68 (2010) (one-quarter of news 
stories on the Supreme Court cover civil rights cases, and half of these stories are about 
affirmative action).  For example, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), a race 
discrimination suit brought by white employees, garnered substantial media attention.  See 
SOLBERG & WALTENBURG, supra, at 68. 
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As for disability, there would be little reason to expect that 
decisionmakers would believe that members of the advantaged group would 
engage in any significant usage of a symmetrical antidiscrimination law.  
Preferences for those with disabilities are still too rare.109  However, if the 
reasonable accommodation mandate of disability law were made available 
to a universal protected class, such that anybody could seek a needed 
accommodation, one could expect such a law to be used widely across the 
spectrum of employees.110 
I have so far relied on the relevant theoretical literature to explore the 
impact of a symmetrical or asymmetrical design on the distributive 
consequences of antidiscrimination mandates.  We can also draw lessons 
from empirical research on the consequences of symmetrical and 
asymmetrical antidiscrimination laws.  Although data is limited, it tends to 
confirm the conclusions posited above.   
Starting with asymmetrical antidiscrimination laws, the ADEA and the 
ADA have both been shown to reduce the employment levels of the groups 
they protect.  As for the ADEA, the law’s initial impact may have been 
favorable to older workers, primarily because it banned the then common 
practice of advertising age limits for jobs, and perhaps because it helped to 
change social norms regarding age.111  Research on the later effects of the 
ADEA paint a far less rosy picture.  While the ADEA may help older 
workers retain jobs, it has also been linked to a reduction in their 
employment levels.112  As for the ADA, research has likewise shown that 
this law too has hurt the workers it intended to help by significantly 
reducing employment levels of disabled workers.113   
                                                                                                                       
108 See, e.g., White Firefighters Awarded $2.5 Million in Discrimination Case, NBC 
NEWS (Feb. 9, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/09/10362607-
white-firefighters-awarded-25-million-in-discrimination-case.   
109 See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text for examples. 
110 I discuss this possibility in greater detail when addressing how the analysis in Part 
II applies specifically to disability.  See infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text. 
111 See Lahey, supra note 69, at 685. 
112 See Michael C. Harper, A Gap in the Agenda: Enhancing the Regulation of Age 
Discrimination in Employment, in EMPLOYMENT LAW INITIATIVES UNDER THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION 608-09 (Zev Eigen & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2011); Lahey, supra note 
69, at 685.  One study found these employment effects only for men.  Id. at 686.  This may 
be because, as Jolls predicted, occupational segregation may mean that the effect of the 
mandate on women is on wages rather than employment levels.  See supra note 19 and 
accompanying text.  These studies did not assess effects on wages.   
113 See Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, The Effects Of “Reasonable Accommodations” 
Requirements And Firing Costs On The Employment Of Individuals With Disabilities 
(2004) (unpublished manuscript) (identifying the ADA as the causal mechanism behind the 
decline in the disability employment rate following the passage of the ADA); Acemoglu & 
Angrist, supra note 69, at 915 (finding a “sharp drop in the employment of disabled 
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As for symmetrical antidiscrimination law, since the passage of Title 
VII in 1964, women and individuals of color have made great strides in the 
workplace.114  The challenge is assigning the causal mechanism of this 
progress, given the increase in human capital by these groups, as well as 
changes in societal attitudes towards these groups.115  It is possible that Title 
VII served some countervailing function in hindering the progress of 
disadvantaged groups in the fashion that Jolls’s analysis would predict, but 
that these other changes overcame this impact.116  It is thus quite difficult to 
assess whether Title VII has had any negative impact on these groups.   
Another data point comes from the FMLA, which provides leave for the 
birth or care of a newborn symmetrically to men and women.117  The data 
on the FMLA is mixed, but gives some reason to believe that the 
symmetrical design of the FMLA has protected women from the adverse 
consequences of a more targeted mandate.118  The literature suggests that 
the FMLA has had a modest positive effect on women’s employment 
                                                                                                                       
workers after the ADA went into effect”); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment 
Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693 (2000) (finding 
that after the passage of the ADA, “employment rates of men with disabilities decreased 
dramatically”); Jolls, supra note 19, at 276; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 533-34, 538-39 (2004) (documenting that employment 
levels of the disabled “declined dramatically” after the passage of the ADA).   
Several scholars have sought to undermine these conclusions by offering an alternative 
account of this data.  See David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, The Rise in the Disability 
Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment, 118 Q. J. ECON. 157 (2003); Peter Blanck, et al., 
Calibrating the Impact of the ADA’s Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
267 (2003); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities 
Following the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31 (2003).  As disability law scholar Sam Bagenstos 
has argued, however, these scholars have either unjustifiably critiqued the data on which 
the initial studies relied, Bagenstos, supra, at 540-50, or wrongly placed too much blame 
on an alternative cause for the decline, id. at 553-55.  Bagenstos instead reads the data as 
showing that the ADA did have a negative impact on the employment of those with 
disabilities, although he limits the decline to those persons whose disability limits the kind 
or amount of work they can do.  See id. at 555.   
114 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic 
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. 
LIT. 1603, 1604 (1991). 
115 Id. at 1605-06. 
116 And these potential causes are not independent; there may be interaction between 
Title VII and the achievement of human capital as well as changes in societal attitudes. 
117 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(A), (B). 
118  If the FMLA does not have adverse consequences on women, it will be hard to 
disentangle the effect of making child-care leave symmetrical, as compared with the 
availability of other forms of leave under the law, such as self-care leave, that men are 
more likely to take than child-care leave.  See supra note 85.   
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levels.119  Given occupational segregation, this is not surprising under 
Jolls’s analysis.120  The question then is whether the FMLA has had a 
negative impact on women’s wages.  One study showed that women did not 
suffer any negative impact on wages after the passage of the FMLA.121  
However, this study suffers from the fact that many female workers were 
entitled by state law or firm policy to FMLA-type benefits prior to the 
FMLA’s passage.122  Other research, though perhaps relevant, is less 
helpful.  A study of the impact of European leave policies found that short-
term (three months) of even paid leave did not reduce women’s wages, but 
this study lumped together leave policies that applied only to women and 
those that applied to both women and men.123  Yet another study found that 
the FMLA had a negative impact on the wages of women who took leave, 
but did not assess whether the FMLA affected the wages of women of 
child-bearing age more generally.124  But we might not be too surprised 
with any findings of negative distributive consequences of the FMLA from 
studies conducted in the 1990s, when decisionmakers would be more likely 
to assume that women would use the law more than men.125 
 
b. Interlocking Stereotypes 
 
Symmetry furthers antisubordination goals by combating harmful 
stereotypes that contribute to the subordination of disadvantaged groups.  
The stereotypes that apply to a disadvantaged group are often also 
                                                
119 Lester, supra note 69, at 37-38 (collecting studies). 
120 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
121 Jane Waldfogel, The Impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281, 295-96 (1999). 
122 Jolls, supra note 19, at 297. 
123 See Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave 
Mandates: Lessons from Europe, 113 Q.J. ECON. 285, 285 & n.1 (1998).   
124 SANDRA L. HOFFERTH & SALLY C. CURTIN, OECD SOCIAL, EMPLOYMENT AND 
MIGRATION WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 7, THE IMPACT OF PARENTAL LEAVE ON 
MATERNAL RETURN TO WORK AFTER CHILDBIRTH IN THE UNITED STATES 14 tbl.1, 17 tbl.3 
(2003).  In analyzing these results, one must be aware of an additional effect of the FMLA: 
that it may push women into and keep them in higher-paying jobs.  Therefore, a finding of 
no impact on women’s wages might mask more complex dynamics of at least some women 
improving their employment, which counteracts wage discrimination.  See Jolls, supra note 
19, at 299 (explaining that the FMLA “may have a sort of composite effect, moving 
women into, or keeping them, in better, higher-paying jobs”). 
125 Even though the FMLA provides for both self-care and family-care leave, see supra 
note 85, if decisionmakers assume that self-care leave is taken by equal numbers of men 
and women, and that family-care leave is taken by many more women, then the FMLA 
would have a negative impact on women.  This is especially so because the family-care 
provision of the FMLA is likely to be more salient to decisionmakers than the self-care 
provision.   
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manifested—in mirror-image form—in the stereotypes applied to the 
advantaged group.  Effectively dismantling these stereotypes requires the 
ability to challenge them from both sides, which only a symmetrical law 
permits.    
This phenomenon of interlocking stereotypes is perhaps easiest to see in 
the context of sex, where heterosexual marriage means that stereotypes 
about women’s proper family roles (and workplace limitations) are often 
the flip side of the stereotypes about men’s proper family roles (and 
workplace expectations).  Take the case of a male police officer who sought 
leave as a primary caregiver under state law.  His employer insisted that 
“God made women to have babies, and unless [he] could have a baby, there 
is no way [he] could be [the] primary care [giver]” unless his wife was “in a 
coma or dead.”126  This example, and others like it,127 demonstrate how sex 
stereotypes that limit women at work are instantiated not only through the 
stereotyping of women as mothers first and workers second, but equally 
through stereotypes of men as workers first and fathers second.  Moreover, 
these stereotypes make it harder for men to participate meaningfully in 
family life, which in turn contributes to women doing more care work, 
further reinforcing sex-role stereotypes and limiting women’s workplace 
opportunities.128  Precisely because of these interlocking stereotypes, 
women’s rights advocates, including Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have 
relied on male sex discrimination plaintiffs to combat subordinating 
stereotypes against women.129 
Interlocking stereotypes on the basis of sex also arise outside of the 
family.  In the landmark Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins case, the Supreme 
                                                
126 Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 629-30 (4th Cir. 2001). 
127 See, e.g., Shafer v. Bd. of Public Educ., 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1990) (male plaintiff 
challenging policy that limited child-rearing leave to female employees); Wells v. City of 
Montgomery, No. 1:04CV425, 2006 WL 1133300, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2006) (male 
plaintiff claiming discrimination for taking leave to care for child based on comment by a 
superior: “Congratulations for taking the most time off for having a baby and not actually 
having the baby.”). 
128 For a further discussion of the intersection of family roles and antidiscrimination 
law, and especially how antidiscrimination law falls short by failing to address harms to the 
family, see Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 759 (2013). 
129 Professor Cary Franklin has argued that fighting sex-role stereotypes is precisely 
why Justice Ginsburg’s Women’s Rights Project brought so many cases with male 
plaintiffs when it was pioneering constitutional sex equality jurisprudence.  See Franklin, 
supra note 9, at 104-06 (arguing that “Ginsburg pressed the claims of male plaintiffs” to 
challenge stereotypes “that reflected or reinforced traditional conceptions of men’s and 
women’s roles”).  Likewise, Professor Mary Anne Case has argued that suits by men 
challenging sex stereotypes are critical to the equality of women.  See Case, supra note 27, 
at 3. 
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Court held that denying a woman a professional accounting partnership 
because she was too masculine could violate Title VII.130  The employer 
criticized the plaintiff because she was “macho”; “a lady using foul 
language”; and a “tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed 
[manager]”; and for failing to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, 
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
jewelry.”131  As we can see from these criticisms, feminine and masculine 
stereotypes are mirror images.  Being masculine means being macho; using 
foul language, being tough-talking, and being hard-nosed, and not walking 
femininely, not talking femininely, not dressing femininely, not wearing 
make-up, not styling one’s hair, and not wearing jewelry.  Being feminine 
means the opposite: being delicate; not using foul language; not talking 
tough; and not being hard-nosed; and walking femininely, talking 
femininely, dressing femininely, wearing make-up, styling one’s hair, and 
wearing jewelry.  These stereotypes place women in a double bind in a 
range of professions that require stereotypically masculine traits to get 
ahead: women must act aggressively to do the job well, but must act 
femininely to meet gender expectations.132  While these stereotypes were 
manifested against a woman in Price Waterhouse, they can just as easily 
arise in cases where men are penalized for being too feminine.133  
Dismantling these subordinating stereotypes requires a symmetrical law that 
allows challenges from both sides.134     
                                                
130 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
131 Id. at 235. 
132 Id. at 251 (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose 
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out 
of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women 
out of this bind.”); see also, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Why Are 
Women Penalized for Success at Male Tasks?: The Implied Communality Deficit, 92 J. 
APP. PSYCH. 81 (2007) (finding that women who succeed at male tasks by adopting 
masculine traits such as aggression are penalized because they are viewed as lacking in 
feminine traits such as nurturing); Susan T. Fiske, et al., (Dis)Respecting Versus 
(Dis)Liking: Status and Interdependence Predict Ambivalent Stereotypes of Competence 
and Warmth, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 473 (1999) (relying on same model).  
133 See e.g, Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2004) (male 
firefighter terminated for adopting feminine appearance); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 
Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (male waiter harassed for serving “like a 
woman”); Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery Sch., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (male 
nursery school teacher fired for “effeminate appearance”); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (“effeminate” male turned down for mailroom position).  
134 Because of Title VII’s symmetry, an effeminate man can argue that he was 
discriminated against on the basis of sex because a woman who behaved the same way 
would be treated differently.  See Case, supra note 27, at 4 (explaining that adding gender 
to the list of Title VII’s protected traits is not necessary to protect the effeminate man for 
this reason).  While male plaintiffs have historically faced obstacles in bringing these 
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We can see interlocking stereotypes for other protected traits as well.  
Take age, for example.  A Department of Labor report that formed the basis 
for the passage of the ADEA identified the primary obstacle that older 
workers face as one of “stereotyping,” and “the perception that older 
persons cannot do particular jobs.”135  The stereotypes that hold older 
workers back include the view that older workers are less flexible, more 
resistant to change, and not as competent with new or fast-changing 
technologies.136  Younger workers face the flip side of these stereotypes.  If 
older workers are viewed as too slow and stuck in the past, younger workers 
are viewed as too quick and not stuck enough: great with new technology, 
but less committed, less reliable, and less talented with traditional skills like 
in-person interviewing and writing.137  Again, a symmetrical law that allows 
these stereotypes to be challenged from both sides will be far more effective 
at rooting them out.  
Interlocking stereotypes are present for other protected identity traits 
like race and national origin, albeit less pervasively.  The weaker presence 
of interlocking stereotypes in these contexts may be due to the difference 
between binary traits, on the one hand, and discrete traits on the other.  For 
                                                                                                                       
claims, id. at 49-51 (collecting cases), such claims are now gaining ground, see, e.g., 
Smith, 378 F.3d at 572 (male plaintiff can proceed on discrimination claim based on 
feminine appearance); Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75 (same for harassment based on 
femininity). 
135 U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 
715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2 (1965) (finding that employers make 
“assumptions about the effect of age on [an individual’s] ability to do a job when there is in 
fact no basis for [such] assumptions.”). 
136 See Scott J. Adams & David Neumark, Age Discrimination in U.S. Labor Markets: 
A Review of the Evidence, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 187, 190 
(W.M. Rodgers, ed. 2006); HRM, Age Discrimination Against Younger Workers, HC 
ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.hcamag.com/hr-news/age-discrimination-against-
younger-workers-147776.aspx (citing survey of hiring managers finding that they believe 
older workers need to improve their technological skills); see also, e.g., Hartsel v. Keys, 87 
F.3d 795, 802 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the belief that “older workers are more 
resistant to change and are adverse to learning new methods . . . is the very type of ageist 
stereotype that the ADEA was enacted to address”); Peterson v. Mid-State Grp., Inc., 54 F. 
Supp. 3d 1039, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (allowing ADEA plaintiff to survive summary 
judgment because employer’s professed nondiscriminatory reasons for termination—that 
employee was unable to adapt to the computer system and was resistant to change—were 
consistent with ageist stereotypes). 
137  See HRM, supra note 136 (citing survey of hiring managers finding that younger 
workers are viewed as less reliable and less professional); Armour, supra note 95 
(discussing stereotype of younger workers as “slackers who tend to be less loyal to the 
company”); see also, e.g., Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999) 
(reverse age discrimination claim based on maturity concerns); Nishi v. Siemens AG, 290 
F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same). 
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binary traits, it is easy to view one group as the opposite of, or “not” the 
other.  This is so for sex, and while age is a continuous trait, it may be 
perceived as binary (old and young).  In the context of discrete traits, by 
contrast, there are multiple different groups that fall within the protected 
identity trait, and so no group serves as the foil for the other group.  
Nonetheless, interlocking stereotypes do exist in this context as well.   
For example, one common stereotype of black workers is that they are 
cool, stylish, and hip, whereas a common stereotype of white workers is that 
they are the opposite: uncool and behind-the-times.138  Even this seemingly 
benign stereotype of black workers is subordinating because it may limit 
employers’ conceptions of the types of jobs that are a good match for black 
workers.  For example, a successful black advertising executive may be 
poised for a promotion to be the first black vice president at his firm, only 
to learn that he is to head up the new “urban” division at the company.139  If 
white workers denied positions in the “urban” division are not allowed to 
challenge these decisions, the interlocking racial stereotypes that confine 
black workers to narrower paths for success are fought less effectively, 
from only one side. 
 
                                                
138 Compare ANTHONY J. CORTESE, PROVACATEUR 117 (2008) (noting that “black 
people have traditionally set trends in fashion style, language, and particularly, 
entertainment” and that “black images are often used to impart what is considered ‘cool,’ 
‘stylish,’ ‘hip’”), with Lori Kendall, “White and Nerdy”: Computers, Race, and the Nerd 
Stereotype, 44 J. POP. CULTURE 505 (2011) (explaining how whiteness has been linked with 
nerdiness and uncoolness).  Interlocking racial stereotypes also arise in athletics.  See Jeff 
Stone, et al., “White Men Can’t Jump”: Evidence for Perceptual Confirmation of 
Stereotypes Following a Basketball Game, 19 BASIC & APP. SOC. PSYCH. 291 (1997) 
(finding that subjects stereotyped black basketball players as more athletic and naturally 
talented and white players as more intelligent and hustling more); see also, e.g., Heike v. 
Guevara, 519 F. App’x 911, 919 (6th Cir. 2013) (white athlete claiming race discrimination 
based on basketball coach’s preference for “thug” or “ghetto” players).   
Interlocking stereotypes have also been identified in Native American and white 
identities.  Whites have long been stereotyped as embracing modern civilization, whereas 
Native Americans face both an idealized stereotype of avoiding the evils of this 
civilization, as well as a “negative stereotype of Indians [as] the dupes of missionaries, the 
drunk ‘hang around the fort’ Indians.”  Tod Swanson Through Family Eyes: Towards a 
More Adequate Perspective for Viewing Native American Religious Life, 21 AM. IND. Q. 
57, 57-58 (1997).  These “mirror image stereotypes” of whites and Native Americans “feed 
off each other,” and “work[] together [to] create a destructive system of meaning.”  Id. at 
58, 64. 
139 I draw this example from the television show Blackish.  See BLACKISH: PILOT 
(ABC television broadcast Sept. 24, 2104); see also ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A 
PRIVILEGED CLASS 80-82 (1993) (describing how many black executives are steered into 
“black” jobs in areas such as “community relations” or “minority affairs”).   
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c. Heterogeneity of Disadvantage 
 
This next argument varies from the last two in that the antisubordination 
purpose that is achieved is not in the form of benefits to a historically 
subordinated group, but in recognizing the variety of manifestations that 
disadvantage can take.  The antisubordination view relies on a clean 
division between the advantaged group and the disadvantaged group.140  
The early scholarship developing the theory was focused on governmental 
policies related to race, and it seemed straightforward that blacks were 
disadvantaged and whites were advantaged.141  But in the employment 
context, stereotypes of even subordinated groups may systematically work 
to their advantage in pockets of the labor market.  Moreover, the 
circumstances of subordinated groups and the labor market have changed 
substantially since the antisubordination theory was developed, calling into 
question the neat division of advantaged and disadvantaged groups.  
For some traits, there are reasons to believe that both “sides” of a 
protected trait face substantial systematic subordination, but in different 
ways.  The prime example is age.  While the ADEA focused on the negative 
stereotypes that older workers face,142 younger workers too face negative 
stereotypes that arguably hold them back just as much.  When it comes to 
skills, younger workers may be viewed as less competent.143  As for 
personal characteristics, younger workers are thought to be less reliable, 
professional, and less committed to the job,144 as well as less affable, with 
lower moral standards.145  The stereotype of the irresponsible younger 
worker is only magnified with young adults’ delayed independence from 
their families of origin well into adulthood.146  And younger workers feel 
the impact of these stereotypes.  Younger workers are more likely than 
older workers to report experiencing age-related prejudice, with those under 
twenty-five at least twice as likely to have experienced it as other age 
groups.147  Just 44% of employees ages eighteen to twenty-four believe they 
                                                
140 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
141 See generally Fiss, supra note 14 (relying on state action based on race to develop 
seminal antisubordination theory). 
142 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
143 See Snowdon, supra note 93; HRM, supra note 136 (noting in particular writing 
ability).  Note that age-based competency stereotypes may vary based on the type of job.  
See Adams & Neumark, supra note 136, at 190 (reviewing study finding preference for 
older worker for stamp and coin salesperson and younger worker for CD salesperson). 
144 See Armour, supra note 95; HRM, supra note 136.   
145 See Snowdon, supra note 93.   
146 See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the 
Late Teens through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCH. 469 (2000). 
147 See Snowdon, supra note 93 (reporting on results of 2012 survey). 
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are treated fairly on the job, compared with 64% of employees ages forty-
five to fifty-five.148  The negative stereotypes that younger workers face 
have been particularly problematic in positions seen to require authority.149     
For these reasons, it is not entirely clear that older workers are more 
subordinated than younger workers.  It may be that both groups are equally 
subordinated, but in different ways.  Even the history of the ADEA 
acknowledges that older workers were “frequently preferred over younger 
workers when it came to promotions and treatment within the workplace,” 
whereas “older applicants were treated with disdain.”150  According to one 
recent study, people in their forties were viewed as having the highest status 
in the workplace, while those over seventy were given a higher status than 
those in their twenties.151  Older workers out-earn younger workers.152  And 
when it comes to unemployment of older workers, perhaps the primary 
concern of the ADEA,153 workers between the ages of twenty-five and 
thirty-four now have a higher unemployment rate (5.8%) than workers fifty-
five years and older (4.0%).154  In circumstances like these, it is especially 
                                                
148 Armour, supra note 95 (reporting on results of 2002 survey).   
149 See, e.g., Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999) (twenty-
five-year-old bank vice president demoted after employer learned of his age).  In an 
anecdote reported by Armour, supra note 95, when a twenty-nine-year-old lawyer stood to 
argue his case, the judge joked, “‘Is it bring-your-kids-to-work day?,’” and asked if his dad 
would be arguing the motion.  
150 See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and 
H.R. 4221 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 
90th Cong. 7, 154 (1967) (statement of William D. Bechill, Commissioner on Aging).    
151 See Snowdon, supra note 93. 
152 See Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
74 TEX. L. REV. 1813 (1996).  In light of rising wages for older workers, Christine Jolls has 
argued that the primary purpose of the ADEA may not be civil rights but employer hands-
tying.  Under this view of the ADEA, what underlies the law is a bargain between 
employers and employees, premised on an unstated agreement of rising wages over the 
course of an employee’s career with the firm.  This rising wage is less than the employee’s 
productivity early on, but more than productivity later in the career.  Without protection 
against termination at the later stage, however, employers would be free to breach the 
bargain by terminating employees when wages exceed productivity.  Under the hands-tying 
view, the ADEA prevents this.  While this may or may not explain current law, compare 
Jolls, supra, with Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really 
Age Discrimination? The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 800 (1997) 
(finding this an unsatisfying justification for the ADEA), it is orthogonal to an analysis of 
how an age discrimination law aimed at promoting antisubordination purposes should be 
designed.  
153 See Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 152, at 783-84 (explaining that the ADEA was 
motivated by the problem of long-term unemployment among the elderly and legislative 
findings that “the burden of unemployment was falling disproportionately on older 
workers”).  
154 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population 
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troubling to wall off a group’s ability to challenge discrimination. 
Like age, the neat division of subordination by sex, with men at the top 
and women at the bottom, has become more muddied in recent years.155  
Men now attend college at lower rates than women,156 and skills associated 
with traditional male jobs are not as valued in the current economy.157  This 
does not mean that men in general are moving towards taking on the 
subordinated position in the labor market, but that a bimodal distribution of 
male workers may be emerging.  Men have remained stably privileged at 
the highest levels of the labor market, in top management and professional 
jobs, but are also overrepresented at the bottom of the labor market, leaving 
them less represented in the middle.158  While this trend is still emerging, 
the trajectory should lead us to question our confidence in rigid 
demarcations of subordination by sex in the labor market, as well as any 
law that would recognize disadvantage only of women workers.    
Occupational segregation by race and sex also challenges the neat 
division of subordinated groups.159  While the bulk of this segregation 
                                                                                                                       
Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (last modified July 2, 2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea10.htm.  
155 See generally HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN (2012) (chronicling how women are 
surpassing men in a number of domains, including many measures of education and labor 
market achievement); LIZA MUNDY, THE RICHER SEX (2012) (discussing how soon more 
households will be supported by women than men and the consequences).   
156 See ROSIN, supra note 155, at 8 (“In the United States, for every two men who will 
receive a BA this year, for example, three women will do the same.”); Gary S. Becker, et 
al., Explaining the Worldwide Boom in Higher Education of Women, 4 J. HUM. CAPITAL 
203 (2010) (documenting and explaining this phenomenon). 
157 See ROSIN, supra note 155, at 8 (“Of the fifteen job categories projected to grow the 
most in the United States over the next decade, twelve are occupied primarily by 
women.”).  The decline of men in the labor force is explained by “sweeping structural 
changes in rich economies [that] have reduced the demand for all less-skilled workers.”  
Decline of the Working Man, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2011, at 20, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18618613.  “Men have been hit harder than women by 
these shifts,” because “[t]hey are likelier to work in manufacturing,” whereas “women have 
been better represented in sectors, such as health care and education, where most job 
growth has taken place.”  Id.; see also ROSIN, supra note 155, at 9 (“In the past, men 
derived their advantage largely from size and strength, but the postindustrial economy is 
indifferent to brawn,” as “[a] service and information economy rewards precisely the 
opposite qualities—the ones that can’t be easily replaced by a machine.”). 
158 See ROY F. BAUMEISTER, IS THERE ANYTHING GOOD ABOUT MEN? 16-19 (2010) 
(arguing that male distribution across many measures is bimodal: that men occupy both the 
top and bottom levels of achievement); Stephanie Coontz, The Myth of Male Decline, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at SR1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/opinion/sunday/the-myth-of-male-decline.html 
(critiquing Rosin, supra note 154, and Mundy, supra note 154, for failing to disaggregate 
the top of the labor market, where men continue to surpass women).    
159 See O. Alonso-Villar, et al., The Extent of Occupational Segregation in the United 
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operates to maintain traditional identity-based hierarchies,160 this is not 
always the case.  Occupational segregation can also lead an advantaged 
group to be systematically excluded from desirable occupations.  Only a 
symmetrical law allows this type of disadvantage to be challenged. 
When it comes to occupational segregation by sex, there are numerous 
desirable occupations that are dominated by women.  Table 2 below 
provides examples of female-dominated occupations where the median 
weekly earnings for men in these occupations substantially exceed the 
national average of median weekly earnings for men, which was $841 in 
2014.161  Of course, earnings are not the only relevant factor for making an 
occupation desirable (I return to this point below), but earnings provide a 
simple measure to demonstrate that there are occupations that men might 
desire to enter that are harder for them to enter than women.   
 
Occupation Percent 
Female 
Median Weekly 
Male 
Earnings162 
Dental Hygienist 94% $957 
Nurse Practitioner 90% $1683* 
Registered Nurse 90% $1236 
Occupational Therapist 90% $1146* 
Event Planner 82% $997* 
Social Worker 82% $892 
Elementary and Middle School Teachers 80% $1096 
 
TABLE 2163 
 
One might quibble with my conclusion that men in these desirable 
                                                                                                                       
States: Differences by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, 51 INDUS. RELS. 179, 187-92 (2012) 
(documenting significant amount of segregation). 
160 Id. at 181 (noting that jobs dominated by women and minorities pay less); see also 
Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study 
of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1073, 1074-75 (1992) (“Job segregation is not a separate-but-equal arrangement; 
minorities and women are concentrated in work offering lower wages, less status, and 
fewer opportunities for advancement.”). 
161 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data Annual Averages, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (last visited Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf.   
162 This measure disaggregates the median weekly earnings of men in these 
occupations as compared with women in these occupations because men earn substantially 
more.  The figures in this column with asterisks represent median weekly earnings for men 
and women combined, because figures for men alone are unavailable.   
163 All data is from 2014 and derived from Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 161. 
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female occupations are disadvantaged relative to women.  First, most of 
these occupations require an advanced degree, and men with the same level 
of education could earn more in another (male-dominated) occupation.  
While men (and women) with the same level of education could earn more 
in other jobs, even an antisubordination absolutist would likely measure 
disadvantage not only in earnings potential, but in life opportunities.  Even 
if a man could get a master’s degree in information technology and earn 
more than if he had pursued a master’s degree in nursing, this does not 
negate the fact that some men might prefer nursing to information 
technology.  If men as a group systematically face obstacles to entering 
nursing, they should be regarded as disadvantaged with regard to this 
occupation. 
Second, men earn more than women in these occupations, and thus they 
appear to be advantaged in these jobs.  Much of the earnings gap in any 
occupation is attributable to the fact that men work more hours and enjoy 
fewer interruptions in their careers.164  Even if men in these professions earn 
more, this does not negate the existence of systematic barriers to men 
entering and remaining in these professions.165  And, importantly, the 
                                                
164 See Paula England, Gender Inequality in Labor Markets:  The Role of Motherhood 
and Segregation, 12 SOC. POLS. 264, 270-72 (2005).  
165 Much of the research comes from the field of nursing.  See Christiana Kouta & 
Charis P. Kaite, Gender Discrimination and Nursing: A Literature Review, 27 J. PROF’L 
NURSING 59, 59-60 (2011) (cataloguing stereotyping of men in nursing and its 
consequences, including that male nurses are held back because of inequitable treatment in 
nursing school, as well as workplace stereotypes, such as that men are “considered to lack 
the capacity to provide mothering and caring,” and reporting that men resign from nursing 
during the first four years after graduation more frequently than women); see also, e.g., 
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that denying males the 
right to enroll in the state nursing school violates equal protection); Evans v. Prinicipi, No. 
Civ.A. 02-2258(GK), 2005 WL 485743, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2005) (male nurse suing for 
sex discrimination alleging that his supervisor told him that he “‘d[id]n’t belong here’” and 
that he was treated far worse than his female colleagues).  Another example comes from 
the obstetrics and gynecology field, which has become so female-dominated that it is now 
difficult for men to enter the field.  See Tamar Lewin, Women’s Health Is No Longer a 
Man’s World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at A14, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/us/women-s-health-is-no-longer-a-man-s-world.html 
(quoting chairman of the Council on Resident Education in Obstetrics and Gynecology that 
this “‘a huge issue for male medical students’”); see also, e.g., Veleanu v. Beth Isr. Med. 
Ctr., 98 Civ. 7455, 2000 WL 1400965, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (male gynecologist 
claiming that employer sought to create an all-female staff).  And we can see additional 
examples in other caring professions.  See, e.g., Scott v. Parkview Mem’l Hosp., 175 F.3d 
523 (7th Cir. 1999) (male social worker claiming that employer favored women by using 
sex as proxy for caring attitude); Longariello v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe Cnty., 161 F.3d 21 
(11th Cir. 1998) (male teacher claiming failure to hire); Keller v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. 
Admin., 639 F. Supp. 2d 928, 937 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (male employees of mental health 
facility claiming more favorable treatment of female employees). 
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disadvantage that men face in these occupations is linked to the ongoing 
subordination of women: until it is accepted for men to engage in 
traditionally feminine jobs, these jobs will continue to confer less status and 
lower pay, which primarily harms women.166  
This pattern of occupational segregation holds less true for other traits.  
While there is occupational segregation by race, it is less pronounced.167  
And race-based occupational segregation should be distinguished from sex-
based occupational segregation on two grounds.  First, because these are 
workers from minority races and national origins, even when they are 
disproportionately represented in an occupation, they continue to make up a 
minority of that occupation, as compared to the 90% or greater saturation of 
women in the most sex-segregated occupations.168  This means that the 
degree of exclusion of men in sex-segregated fields is less likely to occur 
for whites in race-segregated fields.  Second, there are fewer occupations 
that disproportionately employ racial and ethnic minorities that would be 
deemed desirable by the wage measure relied on above. 
One exception is for Asian workers, who are disproportionately 
represented in a number of desirable occupations, including a variety of 
technology, mathematical, engineering, and science occupations.169  My 
aim is not to suggest that Asian Americans do not face harmful stereotyping 
                                                
166 See Case, supra note 27, at 34 (describing how the devaluation of the feminine, in 
women or men, will accrue to the disadvantage of women). 
167 See Alonso-Villar, et al., supra note 159, at 188. 
168 Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 161.   
169 See id. (listing, inter alia, statistician, computer systems analyst, medical scientist, 
physical scientist, physicians, and pharmacists); Jay McGregor, 2% of Google Employees 
are Black and Just 30% are Women, FORBES (May 29, 2014, 10:01 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/05/29/2-of-google-employees-are-black-
and-just-30-are-women (citing Google’s workforce as 30% Asian).  Notably, Asian 
workers’ median weekly earnings are actually higher than white workers’ earnings.  Press 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers 
Second Quarter (July 21, 2015), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf ($966 per week for Asians as compared 
with $835 for whites).  While Asian workers as a whole out-earn white workers, the 
distribution of earnings across Asian workers varies, with some subgroups of Asians 
earning more than whites, and others earning less.  See Alonso-Villar, et al., supra note 
159, at 192.  Thus the relative privilege of Asian workers and white workers must be 
viewed more granularly.  And given the numerical supremacy of whites in the workforce, it 
is still hard to argue that as a general matter, whites are subordinated as compared with 
even the privileged subset of Asian Americans.  Recent lawsuits against elite universities 
challenging affirmative action policies as unduly limiting Asian as compared with white 
acceptance rates demonstrate how Asians may continue to be subordinated, even as model 
minorities.  See, e.g., Harvard’s Asian Problem: A Lawsuit Says Racial Preferences Hurt 
High-Achieving Minorities, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21, 2014, 7:19 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/harvards-asian-problem-1416615041.     
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or discrimination that limits their employment opportunities,170 but rather to 
highlight that whites may not be the most privileged race across all 
occupations.171  Only a symmetrically designed law allows disadvantage to 
be challenged in its varied manifestations.  
 
B.  Practice 
 
The symmetrical or asymmetrical design of an employment 
discrimination law matters not only for the purpose of the law, but also for 
how the law is implemented in practice.  Here too there are benefits to 
symmetry.  An asymmetrical law requires a defined protected class.  By 
putting courts in the position of iteratively deciding who is in and who is 
out of the class, such a requirement runs counter to anticlassification 
purposes and stands at odds with a more fluid notion of identity that is 
pressed by transgender and other plaintiffs.  Requiring a protected-class 
determination at the outset of the case unduly restricts understandings of 
discrimination and plaintiffs’ ability to prove their claims.  These practical 
shortcomings of asymmetry are discussed in turn. 
With a symmetrical law, there need be no analysis of whether the 
plaintiff is a member of a protected class.  As one court explained in a Title 
VII case: “By virtue of being a human being, the Plaintiff satisfies the first 
element—he belongs to a race and national origin: white, Hispanic.”172  By 
contrast, asymmetrical laws define a protected class.173  Courts must then 
determine at the outset of each lawsuit whether the plaintiff is a member of 
the protected class.  Under the ADEA, the analysis is quite simple, as age is 
an easily quantifiable trait.174 However, race, national origin, sex, and 
                                                
170 See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & Devon Carbado, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1259, 1268-69 (2000) (discussing how a male Korean American might be stereotyped as 
being “good at math and science, unassertive, quiet, hardworking, uncreative, and 
impersonal”). 
171 See, e.g., Koehler v. Infosys Techs. Ltd. Inc., No. 13-CV-885-PP, 2015 WL 
2168886 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2015) (white plaintiffs alleging discrimination in favor of 
Asians in technology positions); Heldt v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., No. 3:15-cv-01696 
(N.D. Cal.) (same). 
172 Padilla v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., No. 06-CIV-60934, 2007 WL 2364332, at *2 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2007). 
173 For continuous traits, this is less of a requirement than a sense that an asymmetrical 
law that is meant to protect the subordinated group would limit the protected class to those 
within this group.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing how ADEA limits 
the protected class to those over forty). 
174 See Peter Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 
1975, 89 YALE L J. 27, 32 n.22 (1979) (“An age criterion is perhaps the classic example of 
the “formally realizable rule”—a criterion of decision whose applicability is readily 
ascertainable by the investigation of relatively unambiguous, objective facts.”). 
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disability can require a more complicated analysis, which might be 
particularly troubling in the era of Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel Dolezal, when 
the line between male and female and black and white is increasingly 
blurred.175  And because there is no natural or accepted definition of 
disability, this initial classification decision has come to define the field of 
disability discrimination litigation.176  
The need for courts to make protected-class determinations at the outset 
of litigation is troubling.  For those who believe antidiscrimination law’s 
purpose is to limit classifications on the basis of protected identity traits, an 
antidiscrimination law that required these types of classifications would be 
in stark tension with this goal.177  Such classifications recall a disturbing 
history of race and other identity classifications that have been used to 
exclude and demean.178  The volume of employment discrimination cases, 
and thus the volume of classifications, only further underscores this 
concern.179   
Beyond classification concerns, a protected-class requirement will 
unduly restrict which theories of discrimination courts cognize and which 
plaintiffs can proceed on their claims by adding yet one more test to an area 
of law already littered with formal tests.  Scholars have explored how these 
rigid tests have served as roadblocks to new theories of discrimination and 
to plaintiffs’ ability to establish their claims.180  As Professor Sandra 
Sperino has argued, employment discrimination tests, including the 
protected-class test, have led courts to focus too much on the tests and to 
“dismiss claims . . . that do not fit neatly within recognized structures.”181  
Plaintiffs’ claims have been dismissed, despite substantial evidence of 
discrimination, simply because they did not meet the technical bounds of 
the prima facie case.182   
                                                
175 See Elinor Burkett, What Makes a Woman, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2015, at SR1; 
Charles Blow, The Delusions of Rachel Dolezal, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/charles-blow-the-delusions-of-dolezal.html. 
176 See Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 398-99 (noting that this inquiry has become the 
central issue under the ADA). 
177 See supra Part II.A.1. 
178 See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L. J. 1487, 
1505 (2000) (explaining how the one-drop rule—that “any person with even a drop of 
Black blood would have the same legal status as a pure African”—was used to enforce 
segregation); see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (in a case authorizing 
sterilization of disabled women, noting that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough”). 
179 See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 5. 
180 See Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination By Comparison, 120  YALE L.J. 728 (2011); 
Sandra Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69 (2011). 
181 Sperino, supra note 180, at 71. 
182 See id. at 88-91; see, e.g., Harmon v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., No. 08-5227, 2009 
WL 332705, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009) (rejecting an ADEA termination claim despite 
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While at first blush these concerns might sound in the canonical rules-
standards debate,183 there are reasons to be particularly concerned about the 
unduly rigid application of rules here.  It is notoriously difficult to gain 
traction on the central question in disparate treatment claims: whether the 
employer engaged in conduct because of a protected trait, which I refer to as 
the causation inquiry.  In the face of this difficulty, judges decide an 
enormous volume of discrimination cases under a starting assumption that 
not much discrimination actually occurs in the world.184  In light of these 
circumstances, scholars have shown how courts police the boundaries of 
employment discrimination claims by applying overly strict tests that allow 
them to avoid the troubling causation question.185   
Of particular relevance here, we can see the restrictive application of the 
protected-class test under the ADA.  Determining whether a plaintiff is an 
“individual with a disability”—“has become the most contentious issue in 
the administration of the statute.”186  Many scholars agree that “courts have 
inappropriately applied a restrictive definition of ‘disability’ to squelch 
                                                                                                                       
employer comment that “older people are . . . not your best people” because the plaintiff 
could not show that he had been replaced by a younger worker because his position was 
eliminated).  Professor Suzanne Goldberg raises similar objections to the use of a strict 
comparator test as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  See Goldberg, supra note 179, at 
747 n.48 (describing how plaintiff must show that “he was treated less favorably . . . than 
were other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class”).  
She argues that this test has “sharply narrow[ed] . . . the possibility of success for 
individual litigants,” by “miss[ing] important forms of discrimination and foreclose[ing] 
many individuals from having even an opportunity to be heard.”  Id. at 745-48. 
183 See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383-90 (1985), 
for a recitation of the debate. 
184 See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of 
Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2012) (collecting studies showing 
that “most people, in most factual circumstances, are unwilling to make robust attributions 
to discrimination”).   
185 See Goldberg, supra note 180, at 790 (explaining that courts’ insistence on the 
comparator test “provide[s] false certainty to the extent that [it is] treated as elemental to, 
or objectively confirmatory of, discrimination,” and that “this false certainty enables courts 
to elide responsibility for” failing to consider other ways of proving discrimination); 
Sperino, supra note 180, at 71 (explaining that reliance on rigid tests has led to a false 
certainty as to the dispositive nature of such tests, such that courts “reject new theories of 
discrimination, without analyzing whether such theories are viable”). 
186 Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 398; see also Mary Crossley, The Disability 
Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 623 (1999) (reporting estimate that disability 
status is challenged in more than half of ADA cases); Mayerson, supra note 50, at 587 
(“[N]o issue has generated more controversy and divergence in judicial interpretation than 
the definition of disability . . . .”); Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, 
Behavior and the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. 
L. REV. 345, 352 (1997) (“One of the most contentious aspects of disability law, research 
and policy involves the definition of disability.”). 
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ADA cases at the summary judgment stage.”187  Even when genuine issues 
of material fact regarding a plaintiff’s disability status arise, courts have 
kicked out such cases on summary judgment at high rates.188  And even 
when the statute itself has taken a more expansive approach to the definition 
of disability, specifically instructing that individuals who are “regarded as” 
disabled should be covered, courts still take a quite restrictive approach to 
the definition of the protected class.189  All told, this means that a 
substantial portion of ADA lawsuits are lost at the protected-class stage.190  
While amendments to the ADA were aimed at easing these difficulties, 
scholars are not optimistic that they will achieve this goal.191   
Eliminating protected-class determinations shifts the key inquiry in a 
discrimination case to causation, where it is better placed.192  Consider sex 
discrimination claims raised by transgender individuals.  In such cases, 
courts have to assess the threshold question of whether discrimination 
because of transgenderism is discrimination because of sex.193  Some 
courts, as well as the EEOC, have answered this question in the 
affirmative.194  But the symmetry of Title VII provides a substantial benefit 
in such cases: courts do not also need to assess whether the plaintiff is a 
man or a woman to determine whether she is a member of the protected 
class.  This avoided question is one that not only would be quite difficult to 
answer, but would present a troubling irony for female-to-male transgender 
individuals: if the plaintiff’s desired gender identity were accepted, he 
would be outside the protection of an asymmetrical sex discrimination law.  
We can also see the benefits of avoiding the protected-class inquiry in 
the context of race.  Consider what Professor Camille Gear Rich has 
referred to as “elective race”—the recognition that, in addition to racial 
ascription by others, individuals engage in “voluntary acts . . . [of] race and 
ethnic performance [that] are equally, if not more, determinative of how an 
                                                
187 Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 398; see, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99–100 
(1999); Burgdorf, supra note 50, at 536.  
188 Colker, supra note 187, at 110-19. 
189 Mayerson, supra note 50, at 590-91. 
190 See Barbara A. Lee, A Decade of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Judicial 
Outcomes and Unresolved Problems, 42 IND. RELS. 11, 11 (2003). 
191 See, e.g., Stein, et al., supra note 9, at 721-27; Befort, supra note 50, at 2063-66. 
192 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making discrimination unlawful when it is “because 
of” a protected trait).   
193 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).   
194 See id.  Under a strategic enforcement plan adopted in 2012, the EEOC has taken 
the position that discrimination on the basis of transgender identity is sex discrimination.  
See, e.g., EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Servs. Corp., (D. Minn. Civ. No. 0:15-cv-02646-ADM-
SER, filed June 4, 2015); EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic, P.A. (M.D. Fla. Civ. No. 8:14-cv-
2421-T35 AEP filed Sept. 25, 2014, settled Apr. 9, 2015). 
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individual is racially categorized by others.”195  When an individual’s 
elected race does not comport with her perceived race, courts must decide 
whether to consider the employee’s elected or perceived race in assessing 
claims of discrimination.196  
Under a symmetrically designed law, this question is treated as a 
question of causation rather than as part of the protected-class inquiry.197  
This is a distinction with a difference.  The protected-class approach tends 
to treat identity as a static concept that inheres in an individual.  Scholars 
have questioned this understanding of identity, and instead recognize that 
identity is more of a process of social construction and ascription.  They 
argue that “society places people into categories with attendant ascribed 
attributes that effectively constitute a social identity.”198  This means that a 
trait like race or national origin is not simply a biological category, but one 
“constructed along cultural, political, and economic lines.”199  The process 
of social identity ascription also includes how others react to an individual’s 
own identity-related choices and behaviors.200  Given the fluid nature of 
identity, properly understanding identity requires a more flexible approach 
that recognizes that identity may shift depending on context.  Assessing 
these questions as a matter of causation rather than protected class provides 
this flexibility by focusing more on employer conduct rather than on any 
fixed quality of the employee.  
We can see this in the context of racial classifications, where courts 
have tended to show more flexible conceptions of racial identity when they 
are addressed as a matter of causation rather than as a matter of protected 
                                                
195 Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race: Recognizing Race Discrimination in an Era of 
Self-Identification, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1513 (2014). 
196 See id.; Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 
2010 WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010) (in a case alleging harassment on the basis 
of perceived Native American race, assessing whether the plaintiff could proceed on this 
theory even though he had elected to identify himself as Hispanic to his employer). 
197 When courts have treated this as part of the prima facie case, plaintiffs have lost.  
See Nieves v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 598 F. Supp. 955, 962 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (in the case of a 
racially ambiguous plaintiff claiming discrimination on the basis of perceived Hispanic 
race, dismissing case because plaintiff had failed to establish that he was in fact Hispanic).   
198 Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are 
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1288 n.23; see also Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial 
and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1134, 1158-66 (2004); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 
(1994); see generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF 
SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). 
199 López, supra note 198, at 27. 
200 Rich, supra note 195, at 1513. 
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class.  In Wood v. Freeman Decorating Services, the plaintiff claimed that 
he was harassed on the basis of Native American race.201  The defendant 
objected on the ground that the plaintiff “(1) has no evidence establishing 
himself as American Indian and (2) has previously identified himself as 
Hispanic rather than American Indian.”202  The court, addressing this as a 
question of causation—whether the plaintiff was subject to harassing 
conduct “because of [his] race [or national origin]”—rather than 
membership in a protected class, focused on the employer’s ascription of 
the plaintiff’s race, rather than on any inherent notion of plaintiff’s 
identity.203  The court paid little heed to the plaintiff’s birth certificate 
classifying him as white, or to the plaintiff’s previous reporting of his race 
as Hispanic in employment records.204  Instead, the court focused on the 
fact that the “defendant’s employees believed that Plaintiff was American 
Indian.”205  The court reasoned that harassment on the basis of perceived 
race does not alter the fact that this is harassment on the basis of race, nor 
lessen the resulting injury to the plaintiff.206 
In Nieves v. Metropolitan Dade County, by contrast, the restrictive 
results of a protected-class approach can be seen.207  The plaintiff claimed 
discrimination on the basis of Hispanic race, although he had indicated that 
he was Caucasian on his employment application form.208  Even though this 
case was brought under the symmetrical Title VII,209 the court wrongly 
treated the plaintiff’s identity as a question of protected class.210  Instead of 
assessing the employer’s behavior with regard to its perception of the 
plaintiff’s race, the court conducted its own analysis of the plaintiff’s race: 
“the Court notes that neither from observing the Plaintiff nor from listening 
to his speech patterns, mannerisms and pronunciation of the English 
language was it apparent that Plaintiff was Hispanic.”211  In so doing, the 
court focused on protected-class membership as a fixed characteristic—an 
objective and static fact—rather than on the employer’s perception and 
treatment of the employee, and, in so doing, rejected the plaintiff’s claim. 
A “regarded as” provision could be added to the definition of the 
protected class to address these complicated identity-ascription cases.  But 
                                                
201 No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010). 
202 Id. 
203 Id.  
204 Id. 
205 Id. at *4-5. 
206 Id.  
207 598 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Fla. 1984). 
208 Id. at 957. 
209 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
210 598 F. Supp. at 962. 
211 Id. at 961-62; see also Rich, supra note 195, at 1551. 
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experience with these types of rules as part of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case should make us skeptical of this approach.212  Even tests that were 
intended to make it easier for plaintiffs to pursue their claims have been 
applied so narrowly as to have precisely the opposite effect.213  And the 
test-based approach to employment discrimination has led courts to “reject 
new theories of discrimination, without actually analyzing whether such 
theories are viable” under the statute.214  This is particularly concerning in 
the context of the protected class, as the law must be able to respond to 
evolving conceptions of identity.215  For these reasons, scholars in the field 
have consistently advocated a more flexible approach focusing on causation 
rather than the accretion of still more tests that serve as hurdles to rights-
claiming.216   
 
C.  Politics 
 
A symmetrically designed law also brings political benefits, as the 
universality of such laws helps to enhance support for them.  Several 
theories of political support relate to what political scientists refer to as 
“targeted” as compared with “universal” laws.217  Mapping their language 
to our task here, asymmetrical laws are targeted, and symmetrical laws are 
universal.  The first theory, median voter theory, predicts that policy 
choices will tend to align with the preferences of the median voter, and thus 
that policies will tend to be moderate, eschewing the preferences on one 
side of the spectrum or another.218  This leads to the “paradox of 
                                                
212 See Mayerson, supra note 50, at 590-91 (describing restrictive application of 
“regarded as” prong under the ADA).   
213 See Sperino, supra note 180, at 88-91 (explaining how the prima facie case was 
meant to ease the difficulty of proving causation but has been applied rigidly to make it 
harder for plaintiffs to establish claims); see Goldberg, supra note 180, at 734 (same for 
comparator test). 
214 Sperino, supra note 180, at 71; Goldberg, supra note 180, at 728 (The requirement 
of comparator evidence “sharply narrow[s] . . . the very meaning of discrimination.”). 
215 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text discussing evolving conceptions 
of race. 
216 See Goldberg, supra note 180, at 787-91, 807-12 (advocating for more reliance on 
the approach taken in the sexual harassment and stereotyping contexts, which flexibly 
examines the question of causation); Sperino, supra note 180, at 115-18 (advocating for a 
more flexible approach to the core question of discrimination); Stein, et al., supra note 9, at 
737 (advocating for shifting the focus of the ADA inquiry from the rigid definition of 
disability to the more flexible causation question).   
217 See Theda Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies that 
Combat Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411, 412 (Christopher 
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991). 
218 The seminal work on the median voter model is ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
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redistribution”: that for policies with redistributive consequences, a more 
universal law will attain more redistribution in the long run because it will 
garner more political support (by benefiting the median voter).219  This 
would suggest that a symmetrical law, or at least one broad enough to 
capture the median voter, would garner more support.   
The second theory, public choice theory, focuses on the costs of 
organizing and the problem of collection action.  It posits that policies with 
concentrated benefits are more likely to garner support than those with 
diffuse benefits because of the free-rider problem.220  If benefits are diffuse 
across a larger population of people, many of the beneficiaries will be 
tempted to free ride, and thus there will be insufficient mobilization in 
support of the law.221  This suggests that an asymmetrical law, which 
provides more concentrated benefits, would garner more support than a 
symmetrical law. 
The first and second theories can be critiqued for taking preferences to 
be stable and exogenous to legal design, and failing to consider how 
policies shape preferences.  The third theory, policy feedback theory, posits 
that policies create politics.222  As political scientist Theda Skocpol argues: 
“[P]olicies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes. . . . 
Policies not only flow from prior institutions and politics; they also reshape 
institutions and politics, making some future developments more likely and 
hindering the possibilities for others.”223  This is because policy affects 
resources and incentives for the mobilization of political actors and groups, 
and generates interpretive effects that shape how we make sense of a 
complex political world.224  For these reasons, individuals and groups may 
come to define themselves in light of policies and thus seek to reinforce 
them.225   
                                                
219 See Walter Korpi & Joakim Palme, The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of 
Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in Western Countries, 63 AM. 
SOC. REV. 661, 681-82 (1998). 
220 See generally MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS & LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF 
POLITICAL MARKETS (1981); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS 
OF REGULATION 357 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).  Although the dispersion of costs also 
matters, I focus here simply on the benefits, as the dispersion of costs is relatively constant 
regardless of symmetry or asymmetry. 
221 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 11-12 (1965); Wilson, supra 220, at 367. 
222 This is drawn from E.E. Schattschneider’s famous claim that “new policies create a 
new politics.”  E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF 288 (1935). 
223 THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS 
OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 58, 232 (1992). 
224 See Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political 
Change, 45 WORLD POL. 595 (1993). 
225 Id.  
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It is this third theory that I am particularly interested in.  As we can see, 
both symmetrical and asymmetrical antidiscrimination laws have garnered 
sufficient support for passage.  My aim is to assess how the design of the 
law—symmetrical or asymmetrical—affects the politics of 
antidiscrimination law after the law has passed.  And research suggests that 
symmetry will have positive effects on politics in ways that must be 
appreciated. 
Scholars of policy feedback, including Skocpol and sociologist William 
Julius Wilson, have highlighted how universalism can generate more 
positive forms of policy feedback, in particular in the context of race.  
Skocpol has documented the failure of more targeted welfare programs in 
the United States, including poorhouses, pensions, and the “war on poverty” 
of the 1960s and 70s, and blames their failure on the fact that their limited 
scope led these programs to be politically unpopular, which resulted in low 
levels of investments, and prompted public backlash.226  By contrast, she 
highlights the success of universal welfare programs, such as civil war 
benefits, health education services for mothers and children, and Social 
Security, which have enjoyed more political support and entrenchment.227  
Along similar lines, Wilson has argued that from the perspective of 
improving the position of black Americans, universal programs rather than 
race-based programs are more likely to be successful.228  Wilson suggests 
that race-based redistributional policies generate animosity towards the 
beneficiaries of these policies and the policies themselves, and thus that 
universal programs are more beneficial to minorities.229  With regard to 
race, Skocpol extends Wilson’s argument by suggesting that universal 
programs build “collective solidarity” that will benefit minorities by 
avoiding “us versus them” thinking.230  When their own values and needs 
are met by a law, “larger numbers of middle-class Americans would be 
prepared to go the extra mile for especially needy minorities.”231 
While these scholars were referencing governmental programs aimed at 
redistribution, we might adopt lessons from these policies in the context of 
antidiscrimination law.  While employment discrimination law does not rely 
on any public transfers per se, they do amount to government mandates on 
private (and public) employers to redistribute the most significant form of 
                                                
226 See THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE 
POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 253-74 (1995).   
227 See id. 
228 See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8, 10-11 (1987). 
229 Id. 
230 Skocpol, supra note 217, at 432. 
231 Id. at 434. 
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private support: work.232  When viewed in this light, we can see the impact 
of a symmetrical antidiscrimination law in terms of policy feedback on the 
basis of the reasoning set forth above.  Under this view, a symmetrical 
antidiscrimination law, by virtue of its universalism, is likely to generate 
more positive policy feedback, with more successful results.  As compared 
with an asymmetrical law, it is less likely to generate resentment against its 
beneficiaries, and is more likely to generate a broader sense of solidarity in 
a universal antidiscrimination project that can bring benefits, at least in 
theory, to everyone.   
In the legal context, we can also see this type of argument working at 
the level of the individual case, such that a symmetrical law will likely 
generate more support specifically from judges.233  A judge may be more 
inclined to decide for a plaintiff when that judge is able to identify with that 
person.234  Judges, especially the federal judges who decide a large portion 
of employment discrimination cases, are disproportionately white, able-
bodied men.  They are thus more likely to identify with a person without 
disfavored traits with respect to race, gender, and disability (although not 
age).  Hence, we are likely to see, all things equal, a larger volume of more 
favorable precedent with a symmetrical law.  In contrast, with an 
asymmetrical law, we may well see courts crafting an aversive body of 
precedent that makes recovery difficult.  
Note that it is not the case that positive policy feedback invariably 
results from universal benefits laws.  For example, the FMLA, a law that 
universally provides unpaid family and self-care leave to workers regardless 
of sex, has not been considered a very effective policy.235  Political 
scientists have attributed the lack of positive policy feedback to weak policy 
design.  The fact that the FMLA is unpaid means that many workers cannot 
afford to use it, and thus the program did not bring the types of positive 
changes to beneficiaries’ lives that would lead to support.236  Moreover, the 
                                                
232 See generally Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000) 
(discussing the critical role of work for both material and non-support).   
233 I thank Aziz Huq for raising this point. 
234 See Carol T. Kulik & Molly B. Pepper, Here Comes the Judge: The Influence of 
Judge Personal Characteristics on Federal Sexual Harassment Case Outcomes, 27 L. & 
HUM. BEH. 69 (2003); Theodore Ruger, Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and 
Political Science Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1150 (2004). 
235 See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: DEBUNKING 
MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POLICY 204 (2007).  
236 Id.  This problematizes the analysis of legal scholar Julie Suk, who blames the 
FMLA’s relative lack of success on its universalism.  See Julie Suk, Are Gender 
Stereotypes Bad for Women?  Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family 
Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010).  Suk argues that it was the choice to make the 
FMLA universal, allowing both men and women to take family leave and self-care leave, 
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complicated design of the law meant that even seven years after the law was 
passed, nearly half of all workers had not even heard of it, and half did not 
know if they were eligible for it.237  The argument then is that, all else 
equal, universalism brings political benefits to laws aiming at redistribution.   
With this in mind, we can look at our experience with Title VII and the 
ADA through the lens of policy feedback.  The ADA has been far less 
successful in achieving its goals as compared with Title VII.238  As 
Professor Michael Waterstone chronicles, although the ADA garnered a lot 
of support in Congress, it has not achieved two of its most important 
goals.239  First, the ADA was meant to restructure workplaces in a way that 
would increase the employment rates of the disabled.240  But ADA cases 
have had abysmally low success rates, and, as discussed above, the 
employment rates of the disabled fell rather than rose after the passage of 
the ADA.241  Second, the ADA was meant to create a new way of thinking 
about disability—that those with disabilities are not intrinsically limited, but 
instead have been held back by environmental features that can be 
changed.242  Again, this goal has not been achieved.  Courts still conceive of 
disability in the old medical model.243  Waterstone attributes the ADA’s 
failure—what we might think of as the lack of positive policy feedback—in 
part to the ADA covering a large, amorphous group of those with 
disabilities.244  But given the research on policy feedback, it seems more 
likely that at least one of the factors contributing to the relative failure of 
the ADA is that its beneficiaries consist of too targeted a group rather than 
too large a group, particularly when compared with the relative success of 
the universal Title VII.  
 
III. TOWARDS SYMMETRY 
 
Before endorsing a symmetrical approach, the benefits as they apply to 
                                                                                                                       
that generated more opposition from business interests and thus weakened the FMLA.  But 
this argument only addresses how universalism shaped the response of the law’s 
opponents, and fails to account for how other design choices in the FMLA meant that it 
generated little support even from its beneficiaries, despite its universalism.   
237 See HOWARD, supra note 235, at 252 n.26. 
238 See Michael Waterstone, The Costs of Easy Victory, WM. & MARY L. REV. 
(forthcoming), manuscript at 6, 24-27, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2588887.  
239 Id. at 6, 21 n.87, 22 n.97.  
240 Id. at 6, 25. 
241 See id. at 25; supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
242 Waterstone, supra note 238, at 6, 25-26.   
243 Id. at 27 (collecting cases). 
244 Id. at 15, 24. 
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each of the traits under consideration, as well as any costs of symmetry, 
must be analyzed.  This is the task undertaken at the outset of this Part, 
which concludes that the benefits of symmetry outweigh any costs for each 
of these traits.  And even if we decide that a symmetrical law is preferable, 
there are still questions as to exactly how symmetrical the law should be 
across various doctrines.  This Part next considers these questions, 
exploring how symmetry should be implemented at the doctrinal level.  
This has significant implications for current symmetrical law, as the 
analysis suggests a move towards more symmetry.   
To keep the analysis tractable, this Article has focused on symmetry and 
asymmetry in the context of four protected traits in the area of employment 
discrimination law.  This Part makes clear the broader implications of the 
analysis.  It concludes by applying the insights of this Article to additional 
contexts: to additional protected traits—appearance and sexual 
orientation—that have been adopted or are under consideration in several 
states, and to additional areas of law—housing, education, and 
constitutional law.     
 
A.  Weighing Benefits and Costs 
 
Before proceeding forward with proposals for more symmetry, two 
issues must be considered: (1) how the analysis of symmetry and 
asymmetry varies across protected traits, and (2) the possible costs of 
symmetry.  As for the first point, while there are substantial reasons to 
prefer symmetry to asymmetry in the design of antidiscrimination law, not 
all of these reasons apply equally to each of the traits under consideration.  
Therefore, this Part evaluates the arguments for symmetry on a trait-by-trait 
basis.  It concludes that regardless of the trait, there are substantial benefits 
to symmetry.  It then considers the possible costs of symmetry.  Because 
none of the possible costs raise real concerns, this Part concludes that the 
benefits of symmetry outweigh the costs for each of the traits under 
consideration. 
 
1. Trait-by-Trait Analysis 
 
a. Age 
 
Perhaps the strongest case for symmetry is in the context of age, a trait 
that now receives asymmetrical protection.  All of the antisubordination 
reasons supporting symmetry—the cost of the mandate,245 the presence of 
                                                
245 See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
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interlocking stereotypes,246 and the heterogeneity of disadvantage247—apply 
strongly to age, in addition to the anticlassification purpose.248  The 
antisubordination arguments for a symmetrical law are so strong here 
because it is not entirely clear that, all things considered, older rather than 
younger workers are the disadvantaged group.249  
The practical and political reasons to support a symmetrical law are 
weaker in the context of age.  Of all the protected traits, age is the only one 
that is easily quantifiable.250  This makes for a neatly defined protected 
class,251 as well as easy determinations about who falls within the class.252  
From a political perspective, age is the one trait that might be thought of as 
universal by nature.  We all expect that we will become older workers one 
day, and thus even younger workers might view the law as benefiting them, 
in that it will benefit their future selves.  Thus, a symmetrical law may not 
be necessary to garner political benefits.  Moreover, the protected group—
those over forty—is the advantaged group when it comes to political power. 
Nonetheless, the overwhelming benefits for the purpose of the law weigh 
strongly in favor of symmetry. 
 
b. Sex 
 
The purpose arguments—both anticlassification and antisburdination—
apply strongly in the context of sex.  Because of the strength of interlocking 
stereotypes between men and women, allowing men to challenge sex 
stereotypes is critical to dismantling them.253  Occupational segregation also 
                                                
246 See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
247 See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
248 See supra Part II.A.1. 
249 See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. 
250 See Schuck, supra note 174, at 32 n.22.  
251  An asymmetrical law would still require policymakers to decide where to draw this 
line, with all of the attendant over- and under-inclusiveness problems associated with line-
drawing.  See id. at 34 & n.28 (“[C]lassifications embracing large populations will be 
“under-inclusive” or “over-inclusive,” and “[i]n this respect, age classifications do not 
differ, except perhaps in degree, from those based upon other characteristics.”).  We might 
understand the line-drawing problems to be harder here because there is no age at which 
we can be reasonably comfortable that significant discrimination on the basis of old age 
does not apply. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The Brutal Ageism of Tech, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
MAR. 23, 2104, at 20, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117088/silicons-
valleys-brutal-ageism (reporting on ageism in Silicon Valley starting at age thirty). 
252 One more complicated determination is whether protection applies to an 
individual’s perceived rather than actual age.  Current asymmetrical law is silent on this 
question, and ostensibly excludes claims on this basis. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)(1) (limiting 
application of ADEA “to individuals who are at least 40 years of age”).   
253 See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. 
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renders a symmetrical law necessary to address the disadvantage men face 
in a number of desirable occupations.254  These purpose arguments 
underscore the key role of symmetry for combatting the subordination of 
women: if men are not free to express feminine traits, these traits will be 
maintained in a “female ghetto,” and “may continue to be devalued,” further 
reinforcing the subordination of women.255  There is also good reason to 
think that a symmetrical law would reduce the negative distributive 
consequences of the mandate on women in light of the publicity afforded to 
the increasing volume of discrimination suits brought by men.256  
A symmetrical sex discrimination law also addresses the practical 
concerns associated with an asymmetrical sex discrimination law that would 
require determining the sex of transgender plaintiffs.  As for politics, one 
might argue that symmetry is not necessary to gain the support of men 
because heterosexual marriage intertwines the economic fates of men and 
women.  However, historically marriage has not been enough to lead men to 
see their economic interests as aligned with women, and the role of 
marriage here has surely only declined with a decline in marriage rates.257  
 
c. Race and National Origin   
 
When it comes to the purpose of antidiscrimination law, the benefits of 
symmetry in the context of race are weaker than in the context of age and 
sex.  Interlocking stereotypes and heterogeneity of disadvantage are less 
present here.258  The benefits of symmetry sound instead in reducing racial 
classifications,259 and in distributing the cost of the mandate more 
equally.260  There is good reason to think that a symmetrical law will at least 
make some dent in the cost of the mandate weighing wholly on minorities 
because of beliefs about the prevalence of reverse discrimination.261  The 
anticlassification arguments may weigh more strongly in the context of race 
not only in light of history, but in continuing distinctions in social 
acceptability of race classifications as compared with age, sex, and 
                                                
254 See supra notes 155-68 and accompanying text. 
255 Case, supra note 27, at 3. 
256 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. 
257  See Andrew L. Yarrow, Falling Marriage Rates Reveal Economic Fault Lines, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at ST15, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/fashion/weddings/falling-marriage-rates-reveal-
economic-fault-lines.html (reporting on Census data showing that the number of married 
households fell to 50.5% in 2012 from a high of 72% in 1960). 
258 See supra notes 137-38 and 167-71 and accompanying text. 
259  See supra Part II.A.1. 
260  See supra note 104-06 and accompanying text. 
261  See id. 
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disability classifications.262     
Benefits of a symmetrical race discrimination law can also be seen when 
it comes to the implementation of the protected class requirement.263  Given 
courts’ tendency to police cases strictly at the prima facie stage, a 
symmetrical law that avoids the need for classification would lead courts to 
adopt fluid rather than fixed notions of identity that make it easier for 
plaintiffs to proceed on their claims.264  And when it comes to politics, as 
Wilson and Skocpol argue, universal laws garner more political support, 
and thus can be more effective than targeted laws at promoting equality.265   
 
d. Disability   
 
Disability presents perhaps the most contested and contingent case for 
symmetry, at least when it comes to purpose.  At first blush, there might not 
seem to be any reason to implement a symmetrical disability discrimination 
law even from an anticlassification perspective, as it might be hard to think 
of instances when an able-bodied worker might use the law.  But there are 
such instances.  Aside from affirmative action programs,266 the disabled 
might be favored when the perceived talents of the disabled match the 
necessary skills for the job,267 or when a person with a disability is seen as 
necessary for authenticity or to serve as role model.268  These instances are 
enough for an anticlassification purist to support symmetry.269   
                                                
262 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 173, at 31-32 (cataloguing multiple accepted age 
classifications); Mary Anne Case, All the World’s the Men’s Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1655, 1656 (2007) (noting that we still accept sex segregation in schools, athletics, and 
bathrooms).  You can see this reflected in varying levels of constitutional scrutiny afforded 
to these traits, from rational basis review for age and disability, to intermediate scrutiny for 
sex, to strict scrutiny for race.  See supra notes 34, 41. 
263 See Jones, supra note 178, at 1554 (“Sometimes it is impossible to determine a 
person's race, national origin, or ethnicity—especially in a social context where there are a 
number of racial groups and where race-mixing is on the rise.”). 
264 See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text. 
266 See 41 C.F.R. § 60.741 (setting forth disability-based affirmative action obligations 
of federal contractors). 
267 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing examples of deaf workers in 
factories and autistic workers in certain technical positions).   
268 See Ortner v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., No. 91 CA 3146 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 
10, 1992) (paralyzed worker preferred to fill position at Paralyzed Veterans of America); 
Nick Anderson, Gallaudet Marks “Deaf President Now,” WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gallaudet-marks-deaf-president-
now/2013/02/07/17666740-6fdc-11e2-8b8d-e0b59a1b8e2a_story.html (deaf president 
preferred for university for deaf students).   
269 An anticlassificationist might still allow an exception if disability is necessary to 
render the individual “qualified” for the position.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (permitting 
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But the few instances of discrimination against the able-bodied means 
that there is no heterogeneity of disadvantage, and little in the way of 
interlocking stereotypes manifested in actions against the able-bodied.  As 
for antisubordination purposes then, the primary benefit symmetry can 
bring is the reduction or elimination of the negative employment 
consequences of an asymmetrical mandate like the ADA.270  Note that 
precisely because of the few instances in which the able-bodied are 
discriminated against, simply making the law symmetrical by allowing 
anyone to sue on the basis of disability status under the existing definition 
of disability—e.g., the hearing employee denied a job by an employer with 
a preference for the deaf271— would be insufficient to distribute the cost of 
the mandate more equally.   
Rather, an alternative approach to symmetry, which would universalize 
the class of who can be considered disabled, is required.  This would be 
achieved by allowing anyone to claim that she had been discriminated 
against on the basis of any physical or mental impairment, and along with it 
the right to seek a reasonable accommodation.272  If disability law adopted 
this type of symmetry, there is good reason to believe that decisionmakers 
would not assume that visibly disabled workers were systematically more 
costly than those without a visible disability.  A universal approach to 
reasonable accommodations for antidiscrimination purposes would not be 
unprecedented, as the right to a reasonable accommodation on the basis of 
religion applies to all employees, believers and non-believers alike.273  
Scholars have suggested benefits of this approach in the context of 
disability.274  
                                                                                                                       
employers not to hire those with disabilities if such individuals are not “qualified”).  
270 See supra note 113 (citing studies finding that the ADA substantially reduced 
employment levels of the disabled).   
271  See supra note 3 and accompanying text.   
272 This would also include the ability to raise a claim that the lack of a disability 
resulted in discrimination, as in the role model and disability preference cases.  
273 See, e.g., Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that a 
hotel manager could seek an accommodation from meetings with religious representatives 
delivering bibles if they would “offend [the employee]’s religious or antireligious 
sensibilities”); EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 621 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that Title VII prohibits an employer from compelling its atheist employees to 
attend religious services).   
274 Such a view of the ADA was first proposed by Professor Robert L. Burgdorf.  See 
Burgdorf, supra note 50, at 536 (arguing, inter alia, that this approach to disability would 
better comport with civil rights law and that it would avoid the stigma of being labeled 
“disabled” that might lead some not to make use of the law).  Other scholars have also 
written in favor of this view.  See Stein, et al., supra note 9, at 750-55 (discussing similar 
proposal and arguing that it brings structural, expressive, economic, and hedonic benefits, 
especially in light of an ageing and less able workforce).   
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The analysis in Part II allows for a reconsideration of the primary 
objection to this universal approach to disability law, raised by Professor 
Sam Bagenstos: that it fails to focus on the category of persons with 
conditions that have historically been subordinated.275  As he writes: “while 
every person at some point has some physical or mental condition that 
could be described as an impairment, and many may suffer isolated 
instances of poor treatment as a result, only a smaller group of people is 
‘designated handicapped’ in the process” and subject to “systematic 
disadvantage through the mechanisms of prejudice, stereotypes, and 
neglect.”276  Under my analysis, however, the universal approach to 
disability law is actually more antisubordinationist in its effect as compared 
with a disability law that adopts a more limited protected class.  This is 
because a universal law can reduce or eliminate the harmful impact that the 
ADA has had on the employment levels of disabled persons. 
Finally, a symmetrical disability law would also bring practical and 
political benefits.  The protected-class approach under the ADA has been 
identified as the key impediment to rights-claiming under the ADA.277  And 
a key reason for the ADA’s relative lack of success may well be that its 
asymmetry weakened support for law.278  One might suppose that symmetry 
is unnecessary for political support in the context of disability on somewhat 
similar grounds to age: because we all might become disabled, we are all 
potential beneficiaries of the law.  However, optimism bias will lead non-
disabled individuals not to view themselves as potentially disabled, and thus 
symmetry would seem to be necessary for broad support.279 
 
2. Concerns 
 
Before advocating for a more symmetrical antidiscrimination law, any 
costs of symmetry must also be considered.  Critics are likely to raise the 
following concerns: (a) diluting the expressive function of 
antidiscrimination law; (b) increasing economic costs of an expanded 
antidiscrimination law; and (c) weakening employers’ antisubordination 
initiatives, such as voluntary affirmative action programs.  This Part 
discusses these concerns in turn, concluding that none presents a significant 
objection to symmetry.     
                                                
275 Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 478-81. 
276 Id. at 479. 
277 See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text. 
278 See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text. 
279 See Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 87, at 1524 (“A common feature of human 
behavior is overoptimism: People tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen 
to them than to others.”). 
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a. Expressive Function  
 
In arguing above that a symmetrical law provides benefits for both the 
anticlassification and antisubordination purposes of antidiscrimination law, 
my claims were grounded in the consequences the law would have on the 
basis of the liability that it imposes on regulated entities.  But there may 
also be values at stake in regulating discrimination that are not fully 
captured simply by looking at the impact of imposing liability.  The 
expressive function of law—that is, the message that a law conveys—is one 
such value.280  As Professor Cass Sunstein elucidates, the expressive 
function can be described as important in two distinct regards: for the 
consequences that the message the law sends has on social norms and 
behavior, and for the statement in and of itself as “the expression of the 
appropriate evaluative attitude” consistent with society’s conception of 
itself.281   
The expressive function of governmental action has been viewed as 
particularly important in the area of antidiscrimination law in both 
regards.282  As for the first function, “[a]ntidiscrimination law is often 
designed to change norms to ensure that people are treated with a kind of 
dignity and respect that discriminatory behavior seems to deny.”283  As for 
the second function, “[a] society might . . . insist on an antidiscrimination 
law for expressive reasons even if it does not know whether the law actually 
helps members of minority groups.”284  
Here, the concern that an expressivist would raise is as follows.  I make 
the case above that a symmetrical law better enforces the antisubordination 
goals of antidiscrimination law.285  But for an antisubordination 
expressivist, an asymmetrical law better expresses the message that 
disadvantaged groups are most in need of discrimination protection, or 
                                                
280 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: 
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal 
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Expressive Function]; Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability].  But see generally 
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1363 (2000) (critiquing the expressive theory of law).  
281 Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 280, at 822-23. 
282 See id. at 829; Adler, supra note 280, at 1428; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 280, 
at 1533. 
283 Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 280, at 2044. 
284 Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 280, at 823. 
285 See supra Part II.A.2.  
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perhaps the even stronger proposition that discrimination is wrongful only 
when it harms a subordinated group.  An expressivist focused purely on the 
second expressive function—the intrinsic value of the message—might then 
prefer an asymmetrical antidiscrimination law, regardless of the law’s 
consequences.   
An asymmetrical antidiscrimination law thus presents “the most 
important testing case[]” for expressivists, which “arise[s] when (a) people 
support laws because of the statement made by such laws but (b) the effects 
of such laws seem bad or ambiguous, even by reference to the values held 
by their supporters.”286  The way out of this dilemma, Sunstein suggests, is 
to recognize that “any support for ‘statements’ [made by a law] should be 
rooted not simply in the intrinsic value of the statement, but also in 
plausible judgments about its effect on social norms and hence in ‘on 
balance’ judgments about its consequences.”287   
Sunstein illustrates his approach with an example quite close to ours: 
minimum wage laws.  One function of a minimum wage law might be taken 
to be intrinsically expressive: a statement that human labor is sufficiently 
valuable that it must be compensated at a particular rate, and that any less 
compromises human dignity.288  But, as many economists have posited, 
minimum wage laws may increase unemployment of the most vulnerable 
workers.289  While Sunstein admits that “[i]t is not easy to know how to 
weigh the ‘statement’ against the bad consequences,”290 he concludes that 
“if an increase in minimum wage would really drive vulnerable people out 
of the workplace in significant numbers, it is hard to see why people should 
support it.”291  On this basis, he rightly regards clinging to the intrinsic 
expressive value of the law, even in the face of harmful consequences, as 
expressive “fanaticism.”292  In other words, when expression and effect 
conflict, expression must give way.293   
                                                
286 Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 280, at 2045.   
287 Id.  
288 Id. at 2046-47. 
289 Id. at 2047.  As Sunstein recognizes, economists disagree on this point.  Id. at 2047 
n.84. 
290 Here is where Sunstein’s work on incommensurability becomes relevant, as the 
expressive value of the statement and the material value of a decline in employment cannot 
be weighed on the same scale, making it difficult to compare them.  See Sunstein, 
Incommensurability, supra note 280, at 780. 
291 Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 280, at 2047. 
292 Id. (concluding that “without desirable effects on social norms, there is not much 
point in endorsing expressively motivated law”).   
293 An epigraph to Sunstein’s article sums up the point quite well: “‘We are all 
Expressionists part of the time.  Sometimes we just want to scream loudly at injustice, or to 
stand up and be counted.  These are noble motives, but any serious revolutionist must often 
deprive himself of the pleasures of self-expression.  He must judge his actions by their 
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In the context of a symmetrical antidiscrimination law, the tension 
between expression and effect is eased by considering the first function of 
expression: the effect that the law’s message will have on social norms, 
attitudes, and behaviors.  While a symmetrical law may not convey the 
specific message about discrimination that antisubordinationists would most 
prefer, a symmetrical antidiscrimination law is unlikely to have harmful 
consequences for social norms regarding the respect and dignity accorded to 
subordinated groups, as they too are included within a symmetrical law.  In 
fact, even symmetrical antidiscrimination laws like Title VII have had 
significant positive effects on social attitudes towards subordinated 
groups.294  Therefore, a symmetrical law should trouble only those 
antisubordinationists who are concerned with the second, but not the first, 
expressive function of law.  And in such cases of tension, expression should 
give way: the intrinsic expressive objection loses its force when, in fact, 
“norms are held constant,” or even improved, and the circumstances of 
those persons the law is intended to benefit improve.295     
We might also ease the tension between expression and effect by 
recognizing that even the intrinsic expressive message a law sends may 
change over time as the consequences of the law become clear.  If a 
symmetrical antidiscrimination law in fact accrues to the benefit of 
subordinated groups, such laws may come to be seen as incorporating an 
antisubordination message, or at least a message of respect and dignity for 
subordinated groups.  This has arguably occurred in the context of Title VII.  
And if a symmetrical law comes to be recognized as better at achieving 
antisubordination aims than an asymmetrical law, as this Article argues, a 
symmetrical law may even come to embody the antisubordination message 
better as well.   
 
b. Economic Costs 
 
A symmetrical law, by expanding the universe of who can bring claims 
and the types of claims that are cognizable, would be expected to increase 
the number of discrimination claims.  This rise in lawsuits raises cost 
concerns of two kinds—increased costs for judicial administration, and 
increased costs for employers—which are discussed in turn.       
As for judicial administration, the concern is that the rise in 
discrimination litigation will burden courts and the agencies responsible for 
administering these laws.  Our experience with Title VII should alleviate 
                                                                                                                       
ultimate effects on institutions.’”  Id. at 2021 (quoting HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MY 
LIFE 281 (1991)). 
294 See id. at 2043.   
295 Id. at 2046. 
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some of this concern.  Even though Title VII is symmetrical, there has never 
been an explosion of “reverse” discrimination suits, although they have 
grown over the years.296  Given the heterogeneity of disadvantage in the 
context of age, and an expanded right to accommodation under disability 
law, we might expect more reverse suits in these contexts.  But the 
experience of states that have adopted symmetrical age discrimination laws 
does not show a swamping of their courts with suits by young workers.297  
And the volume of litigation alone should not concern us, particularly if we 
have reason to believe that employers engage in appreciable amounts of 
discrimination against the young and against the able-bodied who are 
impaired.  Judicial administration costs are justified if the benefits of 
allowing such additional suits outweigh the costs, and, as we saw in Part II, 
the benefits are substantial.  
As for the costs imposed on employers, increasing costs for the 
employer by making the advantaged group as costly as the disadvantaged 
group—at least as a matter of perception—is precisely one of the goals of a 
symmetrical law.298  Therefore, we should not be too troubled if the law in 
fact does increase costs in this way.  Moreover, there is little reason to 
believe that symmetry will bring any explosion of litigation, as we can see 
under Title VII or symmetrical state age discrimination laws.299   
The reasonable accommodation mandate under the ADA imposes costs, 
and suits under this provision might be the most likely to increase 
substantially under a symmetrical regime.  However, accommodations are 
not as costly as often assumed,300 and accommodation costs are likely to 
decline over time.301  Moreover, the costs can only be appreciated when 
assessed along with the benefits, and the benefits are substantial.302 
Of course, it may be the case that whatever costs symmetrical 
                                                
296 See Kuehner-Hebert, supra note 90. 
297 See Anne M. Payne, Litigation for Discrimination Against Younger Persons in 
Favor of Older Persons, 138 AM. JUR. TRIALS 105 § 1 (2015).  Reputation concerns that 
would linger longer over a younger worker’s career might be an impediment to suit.   
298  See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
299 See Kuehner-Hebert, supra note 90 (citing relatively low figures for reverse 
discrimination claims under Title VII); Payne, supra note 297, at § 1 (discussing research 
on litigation of reverse age discrimination claims under state law). 
300 Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314, 322-23 (2000) (summarizing data on costs of 
accommodations, which find the typical cost to be $200). 
301 See Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 556-57.   
302 See supra notes 266-79 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of 
symmetry in the context of disability); supra note 274 (citing scholars highlighting 
additional benefits of a universal ADA); Stein, et al., supra note 9, at 754 (arguing that a 
universal ADA would reduce sick leave, workers’ compensation and other insurance 
claims, and post-injury rehabilitation costs).   
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antidiscrimination laws impose on employers are passed along to employees 
in the form of reduced employment and/or wages.303  While a symmetrical 
law may depress the employment levels or wages of all workers, if one of 
the key aims of antidiscrimination law is to benefit disadvantaged groups, a 
symmetrical law at a minimum does not operate contrary to its purposes by 
placing the burden of equality solely on disadvantaged workers, and instead 
distributes the cost of the mandate equally, across all workers.    
 
c. Antisubordination Initiatives   
 
From an antisubordination perspective, critics might be concerned that a 
symmetrical law would present a barrier to antisubordination initiatives.  If 
the advantaged group has a right not to be discriminated against, members 
of that group can challenge as disparate treatment an affirmative action 
program meant to benefit a disadvantaged group, or any race-, sex-, age-, or 
disability-conscious measures taken to alleviate a disparate impact on a 
disadvantaged group.  As an initial matter, it is important to remember that 
symmetry is not synonymous with a ban on all classifications.  Current 
symmetrical law permits employers to implement an affirmative action 
program, and requires employers to take actions to avoid a disparate impact 
on disadvantaged groups.304  And a symmetrical law can allow privileged 
groups to take advantage of the same theories: for example, an employer 
could apply an affirmative action program to attract male nurses, or a 
nursing program that relies on word-of-mouth recruiting with a disparate 
impact on men could be challenged by men.305  With this in mind, the 
concerns regarding affirmative action and disparate impact will be 
discussed in turn; there is little cause for concern about either.   
As for affirmative action, Title VII permits employers to engage in 
affirmative action so long as the program is “designed to eliminate manifest 
[identity] imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories,” and so long 
as it does not “unnecessarily trammel the rights of [advantaged] 
                                                
303 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic 
impact of universal mandates on workers.  
304 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (providing for disparate impact 
liability under Title VII); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616 
(1987) (permitting affirmative action under Title VII under appropriate circumstances); see 
Cynthia Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in 
the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-4 (2005) (noting that Johnson is the 
latest Supreme Court pronouncement on affirmative action under Title VII, although it may 
have been weakened by later case law).  Whether disparate impact liability applies to 
favored groups under Title VII is unclear.  See infra notes 332-36. 
305 See infra notes 332-36 for a further discussion of the symmetrical application of 
disparate impact liability.   
62 THE CASE FOR SYMMETRY 
 
employees.”306  Any new symmetrical law could adopt a similar approach.  
While this would not satisfy an anticlassificationist purist, who might prefer 
no different standard for affirmative action, this still provides far more 
protection against classifications than an asymmetrical law.307   
The question from the antisubordination perspective is whether 
employers would be likely to engage in more voluntary affirmative action 
under an asymmetrical law.308  While this is an empirical question, there is 
little reason to think that there would be substantially more affirmative 
action under an asymmetrical law.309  Unlike in the education context, 
where universities have displayed a robust preference to seek diverse 
student bodies on the basis of voluntary affirmative action programs, 
employers have never shown this level of enthusiasm for affirmative 
action.310  Most firms, unlike most educational institutions, are driven by 
profit.  Their primary concern is efficiency, not diversity.  Most employers 
would view affirmative action to run contrary to efficiency.311  And aside 
from legal barriers to voluntary affirmative action, employers also face 
social barriers to these programs.  Given the contested acceptance of 
affirmative action by the public generally, firms would rightly be concerned 
that the adoption of a fulsome affirmative action program might lead to a 
public backlash against the firm, on the ground that the firm unfairly 
engages in “reverse” discrimination.312  There is little reason then to believe 
that employers would engage in substantially more affirmative action under 
an asymmetrical law.  There may of course be outlier firms more sensitive 
                                                
306 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628. 
307 See supra note 59 on the divergence between anticlassification concerns and 
symmetry.   
308 Antisubordinationists might also prefer a laxer standard for affirmative action 
programs under a symmetrical law than the one that currently applies under Title VII.  The 
analysis below suggests that this would not make much difference for an employer’s 
likelihood of adopting an affirmative action program.   
309 For this reason, this Article sidesteps the question of the precise standard under 
which affirmative action programs are evaluated under employment discrimination law.   
310 See Estlund, supra note 304, at 4-5. 
311 This might not be the case in two scenarios: (1) if irrational discrimination is 
leading to inefficient employment decisions, and the best way to address this irrational 
discrimination is through an affirmative action program, or (2) if members of the 
disadvantaged group perform better in the job (e.g., if deaf factory workers actually 
outperform hearing factory workers), and a bona fide affirmative action program was a way 
to get around the ban on discrimination in hiring. 
Even if not for efficiency purposes, one might imagine that a concern about disparate 
impact liability by subordinated groups might press employers to engage in more 
affirmative action under an asymmetrical regime.  But even this concern is not likely to 
make much of a difference, given how few disparate impact lawsuits are brought, and how 
still fewer succeed.  See Selmi, supra note 40, at 738-40.   
312 See sources cites supra note 104-06. 
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to diversity concerns that would engage in more affirmative action under an 
asymmetrical regime.  But they are too few to alter the conclusion that a 
symmetrical law would have a minimal effect on affirmative action.    
In support of this conclusion, we can look to evidence from current 
asymmetrical law, and assess whether employers have engaged in 
substantial affirmative action to benefit older workers or disabled workers.  
The short answer is no.  Aside from the type of mandatory affirmative 
action that applies to government contractors for all protected traits,313 
employers have not engaged in significant affirmative action.314  In any 
event, the bulk of these voluntary programs would pass muster under a 
symmetrical law with an affirmative action standard like Title VII.315  
Likewise, a symmetrical law is unlikely to have much effect on 
employers engaging in measures to eliminate a disparate impact on 
disadvantaged groups.  Alleviating disparate impact is costly,316 and thus 
few employers will engage in it voluntarily for the same reason that few 
employers will engage in voluntary affirmative action.317  As for the legal 
mandate that employers avoid imposing a disparate impact, even a 
symmetrical law will not undermine this mandate as it operates in practice.  
The disparate impact claim was intended with antisubordination purposes, 
to target employer policies that have an adverse effect on disadvantaged 
groups.  In theory, a symmetrical law poses a challenge to the disparate 
impact claim and its antisubordination aim.  This is because an advantaged 
group can challenge as disparate treatment an employer’s protected-trait-
conscious actions taken to avoid disparate impact liability.  In Ricci v. 
DeStefano. for example, white firefighters challenged the city of New 
Haven’s decision to disregard tests on which the white firefighters had 
succeeded to avoid a disparate impact on black firefighters.318  The Court 
held that such actions taken to avoid disparate impact constitute disparate 
treatment unless “the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence 
                                                
313 See 41 C.F.R. § 60.741 (setting forth affirmative action requirements for federal 
contractors based on disability similar to other programs for other protected traits).   
314 This explains the need for law and public campaigns to encourage employers to hire 
individuals with disabilities.  See 26 U.S.C. § 190 (allowing tax deduction for the cost of 
removing architectural barriers for disabled employees); id. § 44 (same for cost of 
providing access); Carlos Slim Helú & Anthony K. Shriver, Pledging “I’m in to Hire” 
Individuals with Intellectual Developmental Disabilities, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2014, 5:06 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/10/21/pledging-im-in-to-hire-individuals-with-
intellectual-and-developmental-disabilities.   
315 See Estlund, supra note 304, at 5-6 (discussing how employers seeking diversity 
could justify an affirmative action program under current law).   
316 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV.  
642 (2001). 
317 See supra notes 309-12 and accompanying text. 
318 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the 
disparate-impact statute.”319   
In practice, however, the potential for advantaged groups to challenge 
an employer’s actions taken to avoid disparate impact liability will have 
little impact on the antisubordination effect of employment discrimination 
law.  This is because disparate impact liability is already essentially a dead 
letter: there are few suits, and even fewer that prevail.320  The Ricci context 
of employment tests is the outlier circumstance in which disparate impact 
liability has had an effect.321  Any cost to disparate impact liability must be 
weighed against the beneficial effects of symmetry set forth above.  Given 
the rarity of disparate impact suits, the benefits of symmetry are far more 
important to the antisubordination impact of employment discrimination 
law.    
A separate question of course is whether the law should require 
employers to engage in more fulsome antisubordination initiatives, such as 
affirmative action programs, or more intensive analyses of disparate impact.  
Such a requirement would raise more of a problem under a symmetrical 
law, and would require more careful balancing of the benefits and costs of 
symmetry.  Notably, advocates of requiring more extensive 
antisubordination measures have assumed the benefits of asymmetry, and 
have missed the countervailing benefits of symmetry raised by this 
Article.322  In any event, such a requirement is so far from our current 
approach to antidiscrimination law that it raises only theoretical concerns.       
 
B.  Implementation 
 
Beyond the basic choice between symmetry and asymmetry, there are 
additional questions associated with implementing a move towards 
symmetry.  First, once a law is symmetrical, a question arises as to whether 
                                                
319 Id. at 560. 
320 See Selmi, supra note 40, at 738-40.  For this reason, this Article sidesteps 
commenting on the appropriate standard for evaluating disparate treatment suits 
challenging employer’s actions taken to avoid a disparate impact.  And there is reason to 
believe that even Ricci, which some have lamented as permitting employers too little 
latitude to engage in efforts to avoid disparate impact, is not as restrictive as it appears.  See 
Richard A. Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1369 (2010) 
(arguing that Ricci is limited to the exceptional case where the victims of an employer’s 
efforts to avoid disparate impact are readily apparent). 
321 See id. 
322 See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, The Future Of Affirmative Action: A 
Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1982), Alex M. Johnson, 
Jr., Defending The Use Of Quotas In Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism In The Nineties, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043. 
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each of the theories of discrimination that the law recognizes—disparate 
treatment and disparate impact—should permit “reverse” discrimination 
claims, and, if so, whether they should be subject to the same standards of 
proof.  Second, once a law designates a universal protected class, questions 
remain as to the causation inquiry, that is, whether an act by the employer 
was taken “because of” a protected trait.  This Part addresses these 
questions in turn.  
 
1. Degree of Symmetry 
 
Disparate treatment claims are the heartland of employment 
discrimination law, and a symmetrical law that did not allow reverse claims 
under this theory could hardly be said to be symmetrical.  But a question 
arises as to whether the primary method of proof for such claims—the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test—should be applied symmetrically 
to all claims.323  Courts are split on whether reverse discrimination plaintiffs 
must put forward additional evidence of discrimination—of “background 
circumstances” that support an inference that the defendant is the “unusual 
employer who discriminates against the majority”—as part of this test.324  
There are two arguments for some level of asymmetry in the application 
of this standard, but neither holds water.  First, the purpose of the burden-
shifting test is to weed out the most common non-discriminatory 
explanations for an adverse employment action.325  When the plaintiff is a 
member of a subordinated group, once these reasons are eliminated, it is 
                                                
323 This test first requires the plaintiff to set forth a prima facie case: (1) that she 
belongs to a protected class; (2) that she applied to and was qualified for a position for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that she was rejected for the position; and 
(4) that the position remained open after that rejection or the position was offered to 
someone else.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).  Note 
that the first prong is meaningless for symmetrical laws.  See supra note 171 and 
accompanying text.  If the plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
employer to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for the failure to hire, which then foists the 
burden back on the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s reason is pretextual and that 
discrimination was the real reason for the decision.  See 411 U.S. at 804.   
324 Compare Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(requiring additional evidence); Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (same); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same); Murray v. 
Thistledown Racing Club, 770 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1985) (same), with Wilson v. Bailey, 934 
F.2d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1991) (requiring no additional evidence); Young v. City of 
Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990) (same). 
325 See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (“A prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these 
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of 
impermissible factors.”). 
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reasonable to infer that the real reason is discrimination, given the 
prevalence of discrimination against these groups.326  When the plaintiff is a 
member of an advantaged group, we might think that weeding out the most 
common non-discriminatory reasons makes an inference of arbitrary 
decisionmaking by the employer just as or more justified than an inference 
of discrimination.  For this reason, some have argued in favor of requiring 
additional proof for reverse suits.327  But the heterogeneity of disadvantage 
suggests that a more nuanced analysis is required to assess when a reverse 
discrimination claim warrants an inference of discrimination without any 
additional proof.  For example, a younger worker might be entitled to such 
an inference in a promotion case, and a male worker might be entitled to 
such an inference in occupations where men have been excluded.328  
Because employers who discriminate against advantaged groups in such 
scenarios are more typical than not, any rule requiring additional evidence 
that the plaintiff’s employer is somehow “unusual” might unfairly limit 
these suits.329   
Second, for antisubordinationists, the primary purpose of 
antidiscrimination law is to improve the employment opportunities of 
subordinated groups.  This might support a heightened burden for applying 
the law outside of its primary purpose.330  But, as Part II suggests, making it 
harder to pursue reverse discrimination suits can actually undermine the 
antisubordination purposes of antidiscrimination law, in two ways.  First, 
applying a stricter proof standard to reverse discrimination plaintiffs would 
make it more difficult to challenge the interlocking stereotypes that 
subordinate disadvantaged groups.  For example, if the male plaintiff in 
Knussman, whose employer told him that he could not take leave unless his 
wife was “in a coma or dead,”331 had been subject to a heightened proof 
requirement, he might not have been able to pursue his claim.  The plaintiff 
was a police officer, and there was no reason to believe that men would 
have been discriminated against in that workplace.  More generally, making 
it harder for reverse discrimination plaintiffs to pursue claims would also 
interfere with the ability of a symmetrical law to distribute the cost of the 
mandate more equally.  If it is harder for reverse plaintiffs to win claims, 
they will bring fewer claims, making it less likely that decisionmakers will 
perceive them as costly under the mandate.   
As for disparate impact suits, it is not clear whether reverse 
                                                
326 Id. 
327 See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1527. 
328 See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
329  Mills, 171 F.3d at 454. 
330 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 9, at 53. 
331 Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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discrimination suits are cognizable under currently symmetrical law, like 
Title VII.332  Some scholars have argued that permitting reverse disparate 
impact suits makes no sense in light of the antisubordination origins of the 
doctrine, which was developed as a way to combat employer policies that 
disadvantaged black employees.333  Putting aside whether an asymmetrical 
standard here would pass constitutional muster,334 it is questionable whether 
an asymmetrical regime for disparate impact suits would further support the 
antisubordination purposes of the law, except in an expressive way.  In fact, 
there may be instances when symmetry would bring benefits from an 
antisubordination perspective, for example, a male nurse challenging a 
word-of-mouth hiring policy.335  Moreover, walling off a category of 
liability from reverse claims might undermine the equalizing purposes of a 
symmetrical law from the perspective of reducing the cost of the mandate 
born by subordinated groups.  But because disparate impact suits are such a 
small fraction of antidiscrimination litigation, their treatment will not matter 
much for redistributing the cost of the mandate, and we might not be overly 
concerned with the resolution of this question.336   
 
2. Causation 
 
While a universal protected class alleviates the most vexing practical 
concerns with asymmetrical antidiscrimination laws, it does not avoid the 
problem of defining the protected trait entirely.  Even if everyone is 
permitted to raise a claim of discrimination on the basis of a protected trait, 
courts still need to determine causation: whether the employer’s action was 
taken “because of” the trait.  This question requires an understanding of 
which employer justifications fall within the boundaries of the protected 
trait and which do not.  Note that courts already face these types of 
questions under both symmetrical and asymmetrical laws.  For example, 
                                                
332 The question has not been before the Supreme Court, and the few cases before 
appellate courts have resulted in a circuit split.  Compare Craig v. Ala. State Univ., 804 
F.2d 682 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting disparate impact claim by white employees), with 
Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1986) (denying disparate 
impact claim by male employees); see also Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1533.   
333 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1507, 1512 (arguing that “[a]pplying disparate 
impact beyond minorities and women is profoundly ahistorical and inconsistent with the 
theoretical underpinnings of the theory” and collecting citations to this effect). 
334 Compare Primus, supra note 11, at 585-86 (suggesting yes), with Sullivan, supra 
note 9, at 1508 (suggesting no).   
335 See EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993) (dismissing suit 
challenging word-of-mouth hiring only on disparate treatment grounds). 
336 Reported cases addressing reverse disparate impact are quite rare.  See Sullivan, 
supra note 9, at 1530-32.   
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this question arises in the context of what have sometimes been called 
“performance” cases—cases that entail the expression of an identity trait, 
such as a black worker wearing braids.  In such cases, courts must consider 
whether an employer’s decision on the basis of an employee’s braided hair 
is a decision on the basis of race.337  
In a move from asymmetry to symmetry, determining causation will 
raise the most new questions in the context of disability, because of the 
ambiguity of what constitutes a “disability.”338  Scholars who have urged a 
universal approach to the ADA have proposed that the causation 
requirement is met when the employer takes an action on the basis of a 
physical or mental impairment, whether real or perceived, regardless of 
whether the impairment is substantially limiting or not, long-term or 
temporary.339  Accordingly, a denial of reasonable accommodation amounts 
to unlawful disparate treatment when an employer fails to provide a 
necessary accommodation for such an impairment.340  To be sure, this 
approach does not eliminate all questions related to the understanding of 
causation on the basis of disability, including what constitutes an 
“impairment,”341 and when an accommodation is “needed.”342  Regardless 
                                                
337 Courts have split on this question.  Compare, e.g., Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 
652, 661, 663 (6th Cir. 1999) (yes), with Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 
232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (no); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) 
(no). holding that employers who act on the basis of seniority have not acted on the basis of 
age); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that discrimination on 
the basis of transgenderism is discrimination on the basis of sex).  
338  See Waterstone, supra note 238, at 15-16 (explaining that “while no movement is 
monolithic,” that “the disability community is perhaps exceptional in its diffuseness”; and 
that despite the “big tent” approach of the ADA that defines disability expansively, there 
“remain significant divisions across and even within groups”).  
339 See Burgdorf, supra note 50, at 571-73; Mayerson, supra note 50, at 597. 
340  See Burgdorf, supra note 50, at 573; Stein, et al., supra note 9, at 737. 
341 The law could accept the broad definition of impairment included in the regulations 
implementing the ADA: “(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as 
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), 
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, 
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an 
intellectual disability (formerly termed “mental retardation”), organic brain syndrome, 
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.  A 
broader alternative to “impairment” might be “condition,” but impairment has the benefit 
of already being used and defined.   
342 For example, if a worker chooses to run marathons with the known consequence of 
soreness that renders her unable to complete her job tasks, does this worker “need” an 
accommodation?  Note that this is not a new problem introduced by a universal protected 
class, as courts already struggle with when an employer must given an accommodation to a 
worker whose need for the accommodation might be considered self-induced, such as the 
failure to take mitigating measures to control disability.  See generally Jill Hasday, 
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of these questions, this approach offers the key benefit of focusing on the 
employer’s alleged discriminatory treatment rather than on the plaintiff’s 
identity classification, thereby avoiding the harms associated with treating 
identity as a static concept inhering in the individual.343 
 
C.  Further Applications 
 
This Article’s analysis of symmetry has broader application to different 
protected traits and areas of law.  This Section considers how the analysis 
applies to two traits that lawmakers are currently considering protecting: 
appearance and sexual orientation.344  Because these traits receive no 
heightened scrutiny under the Constitution, lawmakers are free to protect 
these traits either symmetrically or asymmetrically.345  This Part then turns 
to areas of antidiscrimination law outside of employment—housing, 
education, and constitutional law—and provides some thoughts about the 
extent to which this Article’s analysis generalizes to them.    
 
1. Traits 
 
a. Appearance   
 
Appearance is now only protected in a few jurisdictions,346 but there 
appears to be movement towards more legislation.347  Here, too, symmetry 
                                                                                                                       
Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REV. 217 (2004) 
(discussing this problem and arguing for a modified duty to mitigate).  Courts have already 
developed approaches to address how worker choice intersects with an employer’s 
obligation of reasonable accommodation.  See id. at 219 nn.217-18 (collecting cases on the 
duty to mitigate).  An amendment to the ADA has clarified the question somewhat by 
establishing that for most disabilities, the individual should be considered in an unmitigated 
state.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i). 
343 See supra Part II.B. 
344 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013) (bill 
banning employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); DEBORAH RHODE, 
THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 110 (2010) (citing 
laws proposing a ban on employment discrimination on the basis of appearance). 
345 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying rational basis review to sexual 
orientation classifications); Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of 
Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 533 (2014) (making clear that rational 
basis review is the default approach unless a trait has been afforded heightened scrutiny); 
supra notes 32, 39 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between constitutional 
scrutiny and symmetry). 
346 See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.02(22); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2202(1)(a). 
347 See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Hooters Hires Based on Looks.  So Do Many Companies.  
And There’s No Law Against It., THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 30, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118683/why-we-need-law-protect-against-appearance-
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would be beneficial, primarily due to the presence of interlocking 
stereotypes and heterogeneity of disadvantage, as well as the practical 
difficulties with a targeted protected class.  In the case of appearance, it is 
of course the unattractive who are the disadvantaged group.  Plain people 
earn less than average-looking people, who earn less than good-looking 
people.348  
Symmetry is needed here to combat interlocking stereotypes.  The 
positive stereotypes that attractive workers benefit from are the flip side of 
the negative stereotypes that hold unattractive workers back.  This is 
because of the “halo effect”: the better an individual looks, the better a 
person we think she is.349  We consider attractive people “more sociable, 
dominant, sexually warm, mentally healthy, intelligent, and socially 
skilled.”350  The flip-side of this—the negative halo effect—means that we 
also assume that unattractive people are less “sociable dominant, sexually 
warm, mentally healthy, intelligent, and socially skilled.”351   
Given the benefits that accrue to attractive workers, there might seem to 
be few if any occasions for attractive workers to challenge these 
stereotypes.  But the halo effect may not always lead to positive outcomes 
for workers.  While attractive men may be considered better leaders, the 
“sexually warm” part of the halo effect can work against attractive women, 
making them less likely to be hired for high-level jobs that require 
authority.352  
                                                                                                                       
discrimination. 
348 See Daniel Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1174 (1994) (finding that an attractive worker makes 3-4% more than an 
unattractive worker, which adds up to an average of $230,000 over a lifetime; that even an 
average-looking worker is still likely to earn $140,000 more over a lifetime over an 
unattractive worker; that the effect is at least as great for men as women; and that the effect 
is mostly independent of occupation); Sean P. Salter, et al., Broker Beauty and Boon: A 
Study of Physical Attractiveness and Its Effect on Real Estate Brokers’ Income and 
Productivity, 22 APP. FIN. ECON. 811, 821 (2012) (finding that attractive real estate agents 
earn more and achieve higher selling prices and extended marketing times); Markus M. 
Mobius & Tanya S. Rosenblat, Why Beauty Matters, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 222, 225 (2006) 
(finding that subjects were willing to pay workers of above-average beauty 10% to 15% 
more than workers of below average beauty, and on this basis commenting that the gap is 
at least as large as it is for race or gender). 
349 See Tonya K. Frevert & Lisa Slattery Walker, Physical Attractiveness and Social 
Status, 8 SOC. COMPASS 313 (2014); Mobius & Rosenblat, supra note 345, at 228. 
350 Alan Feingold, Good-Looking People Are Not What We Think, 111 PSYCH. BULL. 
304, 304 (1992); A. H. Eagly, et al., What Is Beautiful Is Good, But: A Meta-Analytic 
Review Of Research On The Physical Attractiveness Stereotype, 110 PSYCH. BULL. 109, 
109 (1991). 
351 See Feingold, supra note 350, at 304; Eagly, et al., supra note 350, at 109. 
352 See Frevert & Slattery-Walker, supra note 349, at 320; Elizabeth Dworkin, Is This 
Woman Too Hot to Be a Banker?, VILLAGEVOICE.COM (Jun. 1, 2010), 
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Other instances in which attractiveness can serve as an impediment in 
the labor market highlight the need for symmetry.  Attractive people may 
prompt jealousy that holds them back in their careers.  Interviewers are less 
likely to extend an offer to candidates of the same sex deemed to be more 
attractive than themselves.353  An attractive worker may even be fired 
because her appearance makes her boss’s spouse jealous.354  
And when it comes to implementation, it is not easy to draw a line 
between an attractive and an unattractive worker.355  This raises a 
substantial challenge in determining who is in and who is out of the 
protected class, both as a matter of defining the protected class, and in 
applying this definition to the plaintiff in each case.  Economists who study 
the labor market impact of appearance use raters to provide assessments of 
appearance.356  In a lawsuit, this would likely require dueling experts of 
appearance fighting over whether the plaintiff is attractive.  As with 
concerns raised in the disability context, some plaintiffs might not want to 
come forward to claim their rights if it required proving that they were 
unattractive.357 
 
b. Sexual Orientation 
 
Federal legislation to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is proposed almost every year.358  For this discrete trait, multiple 
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353 See Frevert & Slattery-Walker, supra note 349, at 320. 
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identities would be considered subordinated, including gay men, lesbian 
women, and bisexual persons.  Anticlassification concerns could arise in 
cases where gay and lesbian workers are preferred, either as role models, or 
on the basis of stereotypical customer preferences.359  A symmetrical law 
would be necessary to challenge such employer classifications.   
Given the largely invisible nature of sexual orientation, and the 
phenomenon of “passing,” or “covering,”360 there is a question as to 
whether the cost of an asymmetrical mandate would be born by the 
subordinated group.  If decisionmakers cannot discern sexual orientation, 
they will be unable to discriminate against the subordinated group in hiring.  
In light of changes in attitudes about sexual orientation, as well as the right 
to gay marriage, it is likely that fewer members of the subordinated group 
will “pass,” and instead will either overtly indicate membership in the group 
(e.g., note an affiliation with gay or lesbian groups on a resume, or refer to a 
same-sex partner), or will fail to “cover” (e.g., allow a wedding 
announcement of a same-sex marriage or images of a same-sex partner on a 
social media profile).361  The likelihood of the cost of the mandate falling 
on the subordinated group, and thus the need for a symmetrical law, turns 
on precisely how apparent sexual orientation has become.   
Perhaps the greatest concern in the context of sexual orientation comes 
in the realm of the practical.  A protected-class approach would require 
pinning down sexual orientation to a static identity.  A tendency to 
recognize sexual orientation as an unchanging biological phenomenon—
that one is “born this way”362—has been associated with a greater 
recognition of gay rights.363  Nonetheless, we might still be troubled by a 
protected-class approach.  First, it does not take account of the fluidity of 
sexual orientation.364  Some would-be plaintiffs may not be willing to 
accept a static conception of their sexuality.  Second, the judicial 
classification of persons by sexual orientation reinforces traditional 
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concepts of sexuality.365  When courts decide an individual’s sexual 
orientation, they tend to equate gay and lesbian identity with expressions of 
desire that accord with conventional heterosexual notions of intimacy.366  
Moreover, there is the risk of “undercounting those who do not fit neatly 
into the[] category[]” of lesbian, gay, or bisexual.367  When an individual 
has not openly identified as gay, courts may only be willing to recognize 
her sexual orientation if she has expressed some form of same-sex desire in 
the workplace.368  In one case brought under state law, the plaintiff’s 
coworkers harassed him for enjoying “‘gay boy music’” and referred to him 
as a “‘dick smoker.’”369  The court dismissed the claim because the plaintiff 
testified that he was a “heterosexual male, was married, fathered a child. . . 
.”370  Of course, this worker could have been harassed on the basis of sexual 
orientation whether or not he was actually gay.  As discussed above, a 
symmetrical law, which would put the focus on employer conduct rather 
than membership in a protected class, would address these challenges.371  
 
2. Areas of Law 
 
Areas of law outside of the employment context, including education 
law, housing law, and constitutional law, also face the same design question 
of symmetry or asymmetry.  Certain considerations from the employment 
context translate better than others to these contexts.  As for 
anticlassification concerns, they apply regardless of the context in which 
these classifications arise.  For anticlassificationists, classifying individuals 
by protected trait to distribute access to valuable goods is harmful, whether 
at work, school, or otherwise.372  And the practical and political concerns 
also transcend domains.  The practical concerns stem from conditioning 
relief on establishing membership in a protected class, which would occur 
across domains with an asymmetrical law.  The political concerns too cut 
across domains because the policy feedback mechanism could be expected 
to play out similarly whenever there is redistribution of important goods.      
                                                
365 See Jessica Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L. J. 525, 529 (2013). 
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Where the analysis shifts is the antisubordination purpose.  The 
phenomena of interlocking stereotypes and heterogeneity of disadvantage 
can be seen in other areas of law, and would support at least some measure 
of symmetry.  As noted earlier, in her role as an advocate developing 
constitutional sex equality jurisprudence, Justice Ginsburg consistently 
brought cases with male plaintiffs to challenge state rules that relied on 
interlocking sex-based stereotypes.373  Heterogeneity of disadvantage can be 
seen in the education context, where one of the seminal sex discrimination 
cases involved a man challenging his rejection from an all-female nursing 
school.374     
The real divergence arises when it comes to the cost of the mandate.  
This is much less of a concern outside of employment.  Most employers, 
unlike most educational institutions, are aiming to maximize profits, making 
cost a far more salient consideration.375  A decisionmaker in the education 
context is far less likely to consider a prospective student’s cost as a reason 
not to admit her as compared with a decisionmaker in the employment 
context.  Moreover, many educational institutions are specifically aiming to 
further diversity.376  Still further, the costs of antidiscrimination mandates 
are far more salient in the employment context than the education context, 
and even the housing context, because there is far more employment 
litigation than education or housing litigation.377  Because of these 
differences between the employment and education contexts, there is more 
reason to believe that an asymmetrical law would lead to more progressive 
and aggressive forms of affirmative action to achieve the diversity that 
many schools, and many antisubordinationists, prefer.  
The bottom line then is that it is harder to reach a conclusion that a 
symmetrical design is superior in these other areas of antidiscrimination 
law.  While a full analysis and final recommendation for these other 
contexts is beyond the scope of this paper, the point here is that the design 
of any antidiscrimination law must take into account the particulars of the 
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domain in which it is operating.  Reaching a conclusion for constitutional 
law, which covers public action across multiple domains—employment, 
education, housing, and beyond—is particularly complex.  This suggests 
that, at least from a normative rather than a purely doctrinal perspective, the 
choice between symmetry and asymmetry in constitutional law should vary 
depending on the context.  While this is a far cry from current law, it may 
nonetheless be justifiable from a more purpose-driven interpretive view.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article offers the first study of the design choice between 
symmetry and asymmetry in antidiscrimination law.  In so doing, it takes 
steps towards understanding the consequences of an ongoing puzzle of 
antidiscrimination law: the divide between symmetry and asymmetry.  For 
many proponents of antidiscrimination law, and especially for advocates of 
subordinated groups, the results are counterintuitive: that a symmetrical 
employment discrimination law that protects everyone from discrimination 
in all directions is more effective in achieving equality and improving the 
plight of disadvantaged groups than an asymmetrical law targeted 
specifically at the group.   
This surprising conclusion not only upends longstanding thinking in the 
area of antidiscrimination law, but also provides an important practical tool 
for advocates, one that is especially needed in light of ongoing drives for 
legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
appearance, marital status, and a host of other grounds.  For those who are 
seeking to improve the circumstances of subordinated groups in the labor 
market through antidiscrimination law, far more serious consideration must 
be given to the choice between symmetry and asymmetry.  
